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German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research
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ABSTRACT
The dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay presents a model where policies that
reduce frictions in the labor market affect the distribution of welfare changes stemming from
trade. I evaluate this mechanism in the context of a set of labor market policies between
2003-2005 in Germany known as the Hartz Reforms. Using establishment-level data from the
German Federal Employment Agency, I show how the intersectoral mobility of workers rose
in the period following these reforms. I use a multi-sector trade model with heterogeneous
workers and intersectoral mobility to quantify the welfare changes from increased Chinese
import pressure between 2005-2012. I find that, in the absence of the reforms, the gap
in welfare gains between the worst-off and best-off labor markets would have more than
doubled.
The second essay is co-written with my adviser, Javier Cravino, and focuses on the empir-
ical fact that aggregate price levels are positively related to GDP per capita across countries.
We propose a mechanism that rationalizes this observation through sectoral differences in
intermediate input shares. As productivity and income grow, so do wages relative to interme-
diate input prices, which increases the relative price of non-tradables if tradable sectors use
intermediate inputs more intensively. We show that sectoral differences in input intensities
can account for about half of the observed elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect
to GDP per capita. The mechanism has stark implications for industry-level real exchange
rates that are strongly supported by the data.
The final essay concerns the correlation between the advent of the Internet and the
xii
global growth in services exports over the last three decades. I present a gravity model
with bilateral measures of Internet connectivity to formalize this correlation. To establish
bilateral connectivity, I construct a novel dataset based on the undersea fiber-optic cable
network responsible for 99% of international data traffic. I measure the degree of bilateral
connectivity using information on the capacities of these cables in order to estimate the
effect of that connection on export growth between pairs of digitally connected countries. I
estimate a positive relationship between Internet connectivity and bilateral exports in data-
intensive industries with an elasticity of 0.25 to 2.25 over a variety of possible settings.
xiii
Chapter I: Trade Shocks and Labor
Mobility in Germany
1 Introduction
Policymakers often want to know how trade will affect various workers in different ways. A
growing literature started by Autor, Dorn, & Hanson (2013, henceforth ADH) has shown
that the rise in Chinese import penetration has had an adverse effect on local labor markets
with high manufacturing employment. Dauth, Findeisen, & Suedekum (2016, henceforth
DFS) have corraborated this finding in Germany, concluding that rising imports from China
have pushed workers out of manufacturing. The fall in manufacturing employment in the
West has led politicians to seek policies that can alleviate the losses of workers forced to
change their sector of employment due to rising trade penetration. But frictions in the labor
market make it difficult for many of these workers to find jobs in other sectors.
This paper presents a structural model with a simple mechanism through which labor
market liberalization policies can affect the distribution of welfare changes stemming from
trade by reducing frictions in the labor market. I use the model to evaluate how a set of
labor market policies between 2003-2005 in Germany known as the Hartz Reforms affected
the response of the German economy to rising manufacturing import pressure from China.
Specifically, I study the question, “How would the gains from trade with China between 2005-
2012 have been distributed in the absence of the Hartz Reforms?” Using establishment-level
1
data from the German Federal Employment Agency, I show how the intersectoral mobil-
ity of workers rose in the period following these reforms. I use this result to motivate a
counterfactual exercise where, in absence of the Hartz Reforms, labor supply curves are
steeper and hinder the degree to which workers can reallocate away from falling wages in
import-competing sectors. By complementing my data with trade flows from the World
Input-Output Database (WIOD)1 and simulating the counterfactual world using the struc-
tural model, I find that the reforms shrank the counterfactual gap in welfare gains between
the worst-off and best-off labor markets by more than 50%.
In the model, countries differ in their production technologies as in Eaton & Kortum
(2012, hereafter EK), and heterogeneous workers select into different sectors in accordance
with prevailing wages and their productivities draws as in Roy (1951). Due to the dispersion
in productivity draws, local labor markets differ (potentially) in their labor allocation to
each sector. In particular, this dispersion determines the slope of the labor supply curve in
each market: low (high) levels of dispersion imply workers are (not) very substitutable and
will (not) switch sectors from small movements in wages. The labor supply curve will also be
shaped by the prevalence of frictions that inhibit worker responses to changes in wages, with
lower (higher) levels of frictions flattening (steepening) the slope. Between two equilibria,
shocks to trade costs or technologies can change country-sector-specific wages and induce
worker reallocation. Since average worker income is equalized across sectors (but not across
markets) in the model, I can characterize the change in welfare across different markets in
Germany.2
By mandating improvements to employer/employee matching technology, reducing firm
hiring and firing costs, and subsidizing firms to employ hard-to-place workers, I interpret
the Hartz Reforms in the model as a reduction in frictions and a flattening of the labor
supply curve. Using the structure of the model, I quantify the changes in worker income
1See Timmer et al. (2015) for details.
2In the quantitative exercise of this paper, welfare will be defined by average real income in order to
capture effects on the overall price level of the market.
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stemming from increased import pressure from China between 2005-2012 under different
levels of frictions. In a world where frictions make workers completely immobile, and the
model predicts welfare changes consistent with one where labor in each sector is a specific
factor. In order to evaluate how the Hartz Reforms impacted local German labor markets’
response to trade, I need a model-consistent trade shock and estimates for the slope of the
labor supply curve in each market before and after the reforms.
I take the model to the data under the assumption that each labor market in Germany
shares the same labor supply elasticity. The structure of the model delivers an equation
for the change in a market’s average level of real income that depends on the changes in
its labor productivities, its labor allocations to each sector, and the country-sector-specific
wages between two equilibria. Heterogeneity in the initial levels of worker productivities
across markets – and thus labor allocations to each sector across markets – exposes each
market to a different demand shock for the same change in wages stemming from increased
trade pressure.3 I instrument for the endogenous relationship between changes in income
and changes in labor allocations with the rise in Chinese import pressure in countries similar
to Germany in terms of size and openness. In particular, suppose that rising Chinese manu-
facturing imports in (e.g.) the UK are correlated with rising imports in Germany, and rising
manufacturing imports in Germany incentivize worker outflow from manufacturing. Then
observed changes in UK imports from China will provide exogenous variation in the changes
in German market-level income through the worker reallocation channel. By measuring the
strength of this channel, I can estimate the value of the labor supply elasticity. Intuitively, in
a market with lower frictions, one would expect the same negative shock to manufacturing
wages to induce greater flows out of the manufacturing sector. I estimate this elasticity
between 1992-2002 and 2005-2012 using the German data and my instrument constructed
from separate trade flow data. I find that labor supply became roughly twice as elastic after
the reforms compared to the pre-period.
3Rising Chinese imports in the textile sector, for example, will put more pressure on markets specialized
in textiles.
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To quantify how the Hartz Reforms impacted the distribution of welfare changes stem-
ming from trade, I need to simulate the model’s response to rising Chinese import pressure
using my estimated pre-Hartz and post-Hartz values for the labor supply elasticity. Doing
so first requires taking a stance on the nature of the shock that incentivized greater inflows
of Chinese manufactured goods. Using data on the changes in trade shares between Ger-
many and China, I show how to back out the implied change in trade costs between the
two countries that is consistent with those trade flows. This approach has the benefit of
not needing to calibrate the model to a given level of the labor supply elasticity, i.e. I can
recover the trade shock independent of my estimation of the elasticity. By feeding this shock
to trade costs into the model under my two estimates for the labor elasticity, I can compare
the market-level welfare changes from 2005-2012 to those in a counterfactual world where
the reforms never changed the labor supply elasticity. I quantify that in the absence of the
reforms, the difference between the welfare changes of the worst-off and best-off markets
would have more than doubled (from 0.24% to 0.57%), but aggregate welfare would have
grown by 20% more (by 0.212% rather than 0.176%).
Intuitively, this result is driven by the pattern of worker selection in Germany following
greater competition in manufacturing from China. Cheaper Chinese goods lowered the wages
for German workers in manufacturing, leading to the least productive workers in each sector
to select into their next-best sector of comparative advantage. This selection induces greater
competition in (e.g.) the non-manufacturing sector, which lowers wages in that sector as
well. In the case where frictions induce total factor immobility, wage losses are concentrated
in the manufacturing sectors and workers in the non-manufacturing sector gain from lower
prices. As the labor market becomes more elastic, workers can more easily reallocate from
impacted sectors and therefore narrow the distribution of welfare changes. In the case of an
infinitely elastic supply (i.e. where workers are identical and there are zero frictions), the
model predicts that welfare changes for all workers would be equal (as in the model of EK).
While the model delivers this intuitive result, some caveats remain. In particular, by
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assuming that removing frictions can make labor supply more elastic I imply that policy can
change the dispersion of labor productivities across workers and markets. In practice, this
is not quite right. While policy can determine the degree to which workers can act upon
their varying productivities, it is unlikely that governments control the true dispersion of
those productivities. When estimating the labor supply elasticities, I can only capture the
combination of the productivity dispersion and prevailing labor policies. My post-reform
elasticity measurement, therefore, could be contaminated by changes in the dispersion of
productivity over time rather than changes in policy since both effects would be observa-
tionally equivalent. That being said, worker flows out of manufacturing in the early 1990s
stemming from German reunification is likely to bias my results in the opposite direction,
as does choosing a smaller adjustment window in the second period (7-year vs. 10-year).
With the magnitude of the result I still find, I believe it unlikely that frictions do not play
an important role.
I also take a reduced-form approach to the labor frictions in a static model in order to
simplify the mechanism of adjustment. To be sure, there are many ways to model labor
frictions in EK and trade settings,4 and research on dynamic trade models with unemploy-
ment frictions is growing.5 But taking a stance on the source and type of labor frictions
is infeasible, as the compact timing and universality of the reforms across Germany would
make it impossible to quantify each channel separately. I use a static framework without
unemployment for tractibility, but research suggests that the Hartz Reforms may not have
been the source of employment changes in the early 2000s.6 This paper does not make the
claim that its model is the only way to construct the exercise properly, but rather that the
model provides an intuitive setup for analyzing the intersection of labor policy and trade
shocks.
My work contributes to several growing strands of literature. First, I complement empiri-
4See, e.g., Hsieh et al. (2013) and Artuc & McLaren (2015), respectively.
5See, e.g., Carrère et al. (2015).
6See Akyol et al. (2013).
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cal papers focusing on the local labor market outcomes arising from national trade shocks. In
addition to ADH and DFS, see for example Dix-Carneiro & Kovak (2017) or Borjas (1997).
I also add to studies on the distributional effects of trade, including Cravino & Sotelo (2017),
Helpman et al. (2017), and Bursein & Vogel (2017) who all find increases in the skill pre-
mium as a result of trade. Consistent with their work, I find that labor markets with higher
concentrations of untrained workers in the manufacturing sector tend to gain less from trade
than do those with more qualified workers. Through my simulation exercise, I show how
increasing lower frictions can narrow the welfare gains from trade, mitigating the losses to
groups left worse off in the wake of increased Chinese import penetration.
The Roy model employed in this paper is similar to those in Artuc et al. (2010), Dix-
Carneiro (2014), and Adão (2015), but my focus is on the China shock rather than exogenous
changes in the terms of trade in small economies. While Caliendo et al. (2015), Lee (2018),
and Adão et al. (2018) quantify aggregate and distributional welfare impacts from trade, my
model follows the approach of Galle et al. (2017, henceforth GRY) in order to incorporate
an analysis of labor policy tools more easily.
My model is a simpler approach to labor mobility than that of Artuc & McLaren (2015),
but it also speaks to the presence of frictions in the labor market that inhibit intersectoral
reallocation. Their paper indicates that a worker’s industry of employment is primary in
deciding whether trade harms or benefits her. This paper builds on that result by modeling
how policy might alleviate worker outcomes in affected industries.
Lastly, my paper is related to the wide body of analyses on the Hartz Reforms including
Jacobi & Kluve (2006), Akyol et al. (2013), and Dlugosz et al. (2014). In the macroeconomic
search model vein, Krause & Uhlig (2012), Krebs & Scheffel (2013), and Launov & Wälde
(2013) conclude that the cuts to unemployment benefits by Hartz led to reduced unemploy-
ment. Tackling the effects of Hartz I and III,7 Fahr & Sunde (2009) and Hertweck & Sigrist
(2013) find important positive effects on matching efficiences. Giannelli et al. (2016) study
7As will be explained in the following section, the Hartz Reforms are categorized into four stages.
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how job duration and wages evolved in Germany in 1998-2010, finding that the median wage
of workers reentering from unemployment declined in the post-Hartz years. I add to this
large strand of literature by incorporating the Hartz Reforms into the context of larger trade
models. My approach allows me to simulate and evaluate counterfactual scenarios in which
Germany is impacted by trade shocks in the absence of the Reforms’ effect, giving me the
ability to speak to the effect of the trade and reform channels separately.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 describes the Hartz
Reforms and their role in the model. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 descibes the
data. Section 5 details my instrumental variable approach and provides results of the esti-
mation procedure for the elasticity of labor supply. Section 6 performs simulation exercises
and evaluates welfare changes from policy. Section 7 concludes.
2 German Social Welfare and the Hartz Reforms
The Hartz Reforms, which came into effect from 2003-2005, were intended as a remedy to the
economic problems facing Germany at the turn of the century. The German welfare system
had become strained by the influx of East German beneficiaries following reunification, its
expenditure accounting for about a third of national GDP by 2000. By the early 2000s, the
unemployment rate in Germany was well above the OECD average, 9.8%-11.2% versus the
6.6% average in 2003-2006. The economy had stagnated with growth figures of 1.4% in 2002,
1.0% in 2003, and 1.4% in 2005. With an aging population on the horizon, the “sick man of
Europe” faced increasing pressure to make vast changes to labor institutions and the social
welfare system.
The reforms, in part designed by eponymous Peter Hartz, consisted of thirteen “innova-
tion modules” for reshaping the German labor market that were gradually put into practice
beginning in 2003. As detailed in Table 1.1, the reforms took place in several stages and
are collectively known as Hartz I-IV. Hartz I-III supported further vocational education,
7
Table 1.1: Hartz Reforms Timeline
Law Adoption of Law Effective Date Measures
Hartz I 1 December 2002 1 January 2003 Setting up of new Personnel Service Agencies
Support for further vocational education from the German
Federal Labor Agency
Deregulation of temporary work sector
Hartz II 1 December 2002 1 January 2003 Introduction of subsidy for one-person companies (Me-inc)
Introduction of low paid jobs (mini and midi-jobs) exempt
from most social security taxes
Threshold size for firms subject to layoff rules raised from
five to ten workers
Hartz III 1 December 2003 1 January 2004 Restructuring of the Federal Labor Office
Hartz IV 1 December 2003 1 January 2005 Shortening of the duration of unemployment benefits
Merging of unemployment assistance and social assistance,
with benefit set at the lower level of social benefits
(unemployment benefit II)
A new definition of acceptable jobs with sanctions for
refusal of an acceptable job
Source: Eichhorst & Marx (2011), Dlugosz et al. (2014), and Engbom et al. (2015).
entrepreneurship, and a rise in the number of Jobcentres in Germany.8 These stages sought
to increase job search efficiency and employment flexibility. In particular, employers were
given more flexibility to vary employment levels without incurring hiring or firing costs and
received subsidies for employing hard-to-place workers, changes that motivates my model’s
focus on intersectoral reallocation.
Hartz IV mainly reduced benefit payout. The German unemployment insurance system
comprised three layers before the reforms: unemployment benefits (UB), unemployment
assistance (UA), and social assistance (SA). UB provided benefits equal to 60% of previous
net earnings for 12 months (32 months for older workers), after which the still-unemployed
moved to the UA’s 53% rate. SA, the last line of support, provided a means-tested lump-
sum transfer to those ineligible for either UB or UA. After the reforms, the German system
became two layers with UA effectively removed: many workers eligible for UA before the
reforms had to rely on a lower lump-sum transfer system provided by the newly-christened
Unemployment Benefit II. Unemployment Benefit I was UB with a new label. In sum, Hartz
8Jobcentres coordinate between firms looking to hire and labor searching for work. They are jointly
administered by the Federal Agency for Labor and the respective local government in order to reduce
coordination issues.
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Figure 1.1: Changes in the Non-manufacturing Share of German Employment
Notes: Data from the IAB-Establishment History Panel (see Section 4 for details). Values are net changes in the share of
non-manufacturing employment in total employment. The dashed lines are the standard error for a 95% confidence interval.
The upward spike in 1998 is due to a 1999 change in procedure that included more workers as full-time.
IV disincentivized reliance on the welfare state with the goal of returning more citizens to –
and retaining as many workers in – the labor force.
Collectively, these recommendations relaxed certain restrictions on the firing of workers,
eased regulation of the temporary labor market, boosted employment flexibility, and weak-
ened unemployment insurance benefits. As a result, I interpret the reforms as a reduction
in labor market frictions. Figure 1.1 presents the average change in the non-manufacturing
share of employment – the largest fraction of the economy – from 1992-2012 in Germany.
As can be seen, net movements accelerate concurrently with the Hartz Reforms. One might
expect large movements into non-manufacturing following import pressure from China’s ac-
cession to the WTO in 2001 (similar to the spike in the early 1990s), but it isn’t until after
the reforms that intersectoral reallocation appears to be a margin for adjustment in the
2000s.
In the empirical section of this paper, I focus on worker movements into this aggregated
non-manufacturing sector. While the Hartz Reforms were not intended to move workers
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strictly out of manufacturing, I focus on this margin for a few reasons related to the data.
In this model of trade, I will show that estimation of the labor supply elasticity will re-
quire at most two sectors. At the two-sector aggregation level, focusing on manufacturing
vs. non-manufacturing is equivalent. However, I disaggregate data in the manufacturing
sector in order to capture more accurately the import penetration from China, which has
been shown to differ across sectors (e.g. the pressure in textiles is not the same as that in
automobiles). Import penetration is very fine at this level of disaggregation, but as a result
the reallocation in any particular small sector can be very noisy. As such, I rely on the
aggregated non-manufacturing sector for identification as its large size makes it less sensitive
to any individual’s reallocation, a fact that I will return to in Section 5.
3 Model
In this section, I present a multi-sector,9 multi-country Ricardian model of trade with het-
erogenous workers as in GRY.10
Suppose there are N countries indexed by i, j and S sectors indexed by s, and labor
is the only factor of production. These sectors are modeled as in EK, i.e. there are CES
preferences across a continuum of goods within a given sector s with elasticity of substitution
σs, and preferences across sectors are governed by a Cobb-Douglas process with shares βis.
Technologies have constant returns to scale and productivities are drawn from a Fréchet
distribution with shape parameter θs > σs − 1 and level parameter Tis for all s ∈ S, i ∈ N .
Iceberg trade costs of τijs ≥ 1 are applied to all goods originating from i and sent to j in
sector s, with τiis = 1 ∀i and ∀s.
On the labor supply side, workers are ex-post heterogenous in ability draws but ex-
ante identical within each group, as in Roy (1951). Denote Gi as the set of worker groups in
9As in Levchenko & Zhang (2014), welfare gains are substantially higher in the multi-sector formula.
One-sector formulas tend to understate gains in countries with dispersion in sectoral productivities.
10See Appendix 6 for the full derivation.
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country i.11 A worker from group g draws her productivity in s in the form of efficiency units
Z distributed by an {i, g}-specific Fréchet distribution with shape parameter κig > 1 and
level parameters Aigs. The market is perfectly competitive, and labor is supplied inelastically.
A fixed number of workers Lig in group g in country i choose the most profitable sector s to
work in, whereafter they suppy their entire labor endowment. Workers cannot move between
groups,12 but they can reallocate between sectors between different equilibria.
This model setup is valuable due to its ability to nest into several other prominent models.
If κig → ∞ ∀g ∈ Gi and Aigs = 1 ∀{i, g, s}, the model is isomorphic to the Costinot et al.
(2012) formation of EK. If there is no trade (i.e. τijs = ∞∀j 6= i) and a single group of
workers (i.e. Gi = 1), the model is isomorphic to Lagakos & Waugh (2013) and Hsieh et al.
(2013). In the case where κig = 1 ∀g ∈ Gi, the model is isomorphic to the Ricardo-Viner
model where labor is a specific factor.
In what follows, I highlight how the Fréchet distributions deliver useful relationships for
the model in equilibrium, taking special care to note the role of κig where appropriate.
3.1 Equilibrium
To solve for equilibrium in the model, it is best to tackle the labor demand and supply
individually. The EK side of the model determines the demand for labor in each sector as
a function of wages while the Roy side determines the supply of labor in each sector as a
function of wages. The equilibrium will be the set of wages that equalize the demand and
supply.
On the EK side, recall that technologies are national (the Tis are i-level rather than
g-level for each sector). While sector productivity heterogeneity will result in an upward-
11In the empirical portion of this paper, groups will be defined by a German local labor market and
dichotomous skill variable (untrained vs. trained) pair. Together, this definition yields 210 market-skill pairs
in order to estimate model parameters.
12Movement between groups implies movement across skill or labor market. As to the former, a limitation
of the data is that it does not accurately capture when or if workers change their education or skill level. As
to the latter, inter-regional flows are not a large margin for adjusting to trade pressure in Germany. See, for
example, DFS who conclude “mobility across regions plays a minor role in the response to import shocks.”
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sloping supply curve (governed by κig) and wages that differ across sectors, wages cannot
differ across groups.13 Denote by wis the wage per efficiency unit in country i and sector s.
The EK solution in this setting for the demand for efficiency units in {i, s} is given by
1
wis
∑
j
λijsβjsXj, (3.1)
where Xj denotes total expenditure in country j and λijs denotes sectoral trade shares from
i into j,
λijs =
Tis(τijswis)−θs∑
k Tks(τkjswks)−θs
. (3.2)
As it will be helpful to reference later, the price index can be expressed by the system of
equations,
Pjs =
1
γs
[
N∑
i=1
Tis(τijswis)−θs
]−1/θs
, (3.3)
where γs ≡
[
Γ(1 + 1−σs
θs
)
] 1
1−σs and Γ is the gamma function.14
On the Roy side, workers choose the sector in which they earn their highest income, and
their choice of sector determines labor supply. More formally, define a set of productivities
Z = (Z1, Z2, ..., ZS) and let Ωs ≡ {Z s.t. Zswis ≥ Zrwir ∀r ∈ S}. Any worker with pro-
ductivity vector Z will choose to work in sector s if and only if Z ∈ Ωs. Denote by Fig(z)
the joint probability distribution of Z for workers in group g in country i. As in Lagakos &
Waugh (2013) and Hsieh et al. (2013), the share of workers in {i, g} that choose to work in
sector s is given by
piigs ≡
∫
Ωs
dFig(z) =
Aigsw
κig
is
Φκigig
, (3.4)
13Workers are paid a country-sector-specific wage for each efficiency unit of supply. Country-specific
sectoral technologies imply that no group has a comparative advantage in a particular sector even if that
group has an absolute advantage. If the per-efficiency-unit wage were larger in a particular group, firms
would enter elsewhere.
14And the overall price level in j can be given by Pj ≡
(∑
P 1−σsjs
)1/(1−σs).
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where Φκigig ≡
∑
r Aigrw
κig
ir . The supply of efficiency units in {i, g, s} can be given by
Eigs ≡ Lig
∫
Ωs
zsdFig(z) = ηig
Φig
wis
piigsLig, (3.5)
where ηig ≡ Γ(1− 1κig ).
Rearranging Equation 3.5 allows for the simpler expression,
Eigswis
Ligpiigs
= ηigΦig.
For the left-hand side of this expression, the numerator computes the total income (efficiency
units × wage) while the denominator gives the number of workers in {i, g, s} (number of
workers in {i, g} × share of {i, g} workers in s). Since this equation holds for all s, the
income level per worker is equal across sectors for {i, g}. Due to the special properties of the
Fréchet distribution, the share of income for {i, g} in s is also given by the share of {i, g}
workers in s, namely
Eigswis∑
r Eigrwir
= piigs.
Summing across all sectors, total income for {i, g} can be defined by
Yig ≡
∑
s
Eigswis = LigΦig
∑
s
piigs = LigΦig,
and summing across all groups, total income for country i can be defined by
Yi ≡
∑
g∈Gi
Yig =
∑
g∈Gi
LigΦig.
Combining the EK and Roy pieces, I can write a system of equations for excess labor de-
mand in each country-sector. First, define the country-level income-expenditure relationship
as
Yi = Xi −Di,
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where the Di are possible trade deficits between countries, and the sum of the transfers are
such that ∑iDi = 0. Then use Equation 3.1 and sum across g in Equation 3.5 to define
excess labor demand as
ELDis ≡ 1
wis
∑
j
λijsβjsXj −
∑
g∈Gi
Eigs. (3.6)
Equilibrium is given by the matrix of wages wis that solves the system of equations ELDis =
0 ∀{i, s} for some numeraire.
3.2 Comparative Statics
For comparative statics, I use the “exact hat” algebra as in Dekle et al. (2008), originally
proposed by Jones (1965). Denote the proportional change of a variable x by xˆ ≡ x′
x
where
′ denotes the value in the counterfactual equilibrium, and the unmarked denotes the origi-
nal equilibrium. As above, the counterfactual state of the world is in equilibrium whenever
ELD′is = 0 ∀{i, s}. The goal is to estimate the proportional change of the endogenous
outcome variables (e.g. Yˆig), using shocks to trade costs, trade imbalances, group-sector pro-
ductivity levels, and/or sector productivity levels (the τˆijs, Dˆj, Aˆigs and Tˆis, respectively).15
In order to form the estimating equation, recall from above that Eigs = ηigΦigwis piigsLig (with
ηˆig = 1) and Yig = LigΦig. I can write the equation for ELD′is = 0 from Equation 3.6 as
∑
j
λˆijsλijsβjs
∑
g∈Gj
YˆjgYjg + DˆjDj
 = ∑
g∈Gi
pˆiigsYˆigpiigsYig, (3.7)
with
Yˆig =
(∑
r
piigrAˆigrwˆ
κig
ir
)1/κig
, (3.8)
λˆijs =
Tˆis(τˆijswˆis)−θs∑
k λkjsTˆks(τˆkjswˆks)−θs
, (3.9)
15As detailed earlier, the Hartz Reforms will alter the estimate of κig. The central shock, however, will be
τˆijs. In Section 6, I detail how to back out a model-consistent shock to trade costs between Germany and
China.
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and
pˆiigs =
Aˆigswˆ
κig
is∑
r piigrAˆigrwˆ
κig
ir
. (3.10)
To solve for the proportional change in sector-specific wages, wˆis, I can use the above system
of equations provided I have: 1) Data on group-level income levels (Yig), trade imbalances
(Di), trade shares (λijs), expenditure shares (βis), labor allocation shares (piigs), and labor
endowments (Lig); 2) Parameter values for the shape parameters on sectoral technologies (θs)
and labor productivities (κig); and 3) A measure of the shocks from trade costs (τˆijs), trade
imbalances (Dˆi), group-sector productivity levels (Aˆigs), and/or sector technology levels (Tˆis).
Once I have the wˆis matrix, I can use Equations 3.9 and 3.10 to solve for the proportional
changes in trade shares and sector employment shares.
3.3 Group-Level Welfare Effects
I define welfare as real income, Wig ≡ YigLigPi , which is equivalent for all workers in group
{i, g}.16 In my welfare evaluations, I am interested in the change in Wig resulting from
increased import penetration from China. Cobb-Douglas preferences imply
Wig =
Yig∏
s P
βis
is
,
from which it easy to show
Wˆig =
Yˆig∏
s Pˆ
βis
is
. (3.11)
Using Equations 3.3 and 3.9 and assuming Tˆis = 1 ∀s in i, it follows that Pˆis = wˆisλˆ1/θsiis .
Using Equations 3.8 and 3.10, I can write Yˆig = wˆispˆi−1/κigigs . Together, these results imply
Wˆig =
∏
s
λˆ
−βis/θs
iis ·
∏
s
pˆi
−βis/κig
igs . (3.12)
16Recall that the Fréchet distibution implies that the share of income in {i, g, s} is equal to the share of
labor in {i, g, s}, which delivers an equivalence for workers in {i, g} regardless of their sector of employment.
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Equation 3.12 comprises two terms, ∏s λˆ−βis/θsiis and∏s pˆi−βis/κigigs . The first term is identical
to the multi-sector welfare formula from trade shocks in Arkolakis et al. (2012), and it
measures the change in welfare given wages. The second term contains all of the group-
specific variation in welfare, and it measures the change in real income coming exclusively
from changes in wages (for group {i, g} in sectors s ∈ S). The changes in wages, wˆis,
incentivize workers in {i, g} to specialize (possibly) in different sectors in response to the
shock. The heterogeneity in pˆiigs resulting from the impact of trade on local labor markets
allows me to differentiate the welfare changes across groups.
Intuitionally, this second term captures the selection that occurs in the wake of import
penetration. Manufacturing competition abroad depresses wages in the manufacturing sec-
tors, inducing workers to reallocate to maximize their income. A worker flows into the
non-manufacturing sector when the income loss from the drop in manufacturing wages out-
weighs her lower productivity in the non-manufacturing sector. As more labor shifts out of
manufacturing, workers in the non-manufacturing sector face more competition, leading to
wage losses in that sector as well. Some groups benefit disproportionately from the drop
in overall prices while others lose disproportionately from the steep fall in manufacturing
wages. The κig governs, in part, the degree to which workers can move intersectorally to
avoid losses due to trade pressure. All things equal, higher κig (as from lower frictions)
will tend to increase intersectoral mobility, which in turn will both improve welfare for the
worst-off groups and lower welfare for the best-off groups.
3.4 Aggregate Welfare Effects
Using Equation 3.12, it follows that ex-ante change in aggregate welfare can be expressed by
Wˆi =
∏
s
λˆ
−βis/θs
iis ·
∑
g∈Gi
((
Yig
Yi
)∏
s
pˆi
−βis/κig
igs
)
. (3.13)
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Shocks affecting wis will have aggregate welfare effects through impact on both income and
sector-level prices. The second term of aggregate welfare is given by the weighted sum of the
group-level changes in welfare. Intuitionally, the second part of the right-hand side shrinks
as workers can more easily substitute for one another. In the limit, κig →∞ implies identical
workers in a frictionless environment, at which point the group-level differences tend to zero
and the welfare gains are simplified to the Arkolakis et al. (2012) term, ∏s λˆ−βis/θsiis .
A seemingly counterintuitive implication of this welfare expression is that aggregate gains
from inter-sectoral trade are strictly higher for κig <∞ than the gains that arise in the limit
for κig → ∞. To illustrate why, suppose that country i consists of a single group, i.e.
Gi = 1, and is in full autarky. Then expenditure shares and income shares would be equal
in the original equilibrium, i.e. βis = piigs. When moving from autarky, Wˆi depends in part
upon ∏s pˆi−βis/κigigs with pˆiigs = pi′igsβis for some new allocation pi′igs. By rewriting this expression
as ∏s pˆi−βis/κigigs = exp ( 1κig (∑s βis ln(βis/pi′igs))) it can be seen that higher values of κig will
shrink the magnitude of the welfare gains. GRY’s Proposition 2 proves that this property
holds for Gi > 1.
To intuit why this property is true, consider the case where Gi = 1 and country i engages
in inter-sectoral trade, i.e. piigs 6= βis for some s. Suppose this country closes to trade and
returns to autarky, and we are interested in the total change in welfare for this transition,
WˆAi . Finite κig introduces greater “curvature” to the PPF and makes it harder for the
economy to adjust as it moves to autarky while keeping expenditure shares (βis) constant.
In the limit for κig →∞, the economy is able to shift most easily to its new labor allocations,
i.e. higher κig tends to shrink WˆAi . If we define the gains from trade as GFTi ≡ 1− WˆAi , it
is easy to see why opening to trade would yield higher aggregate welfare changes in country
i the lower is the value of κi.
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4 Data
For the empirical analysis, I combine data from a few sources. As my setting is in Germany,
the most important source is labor market data at the regional and sectoral level. The IAB-
Establishment History Panel (BHP)17 includes the universe of all German establishments
with at least one employee subject to social security. These administrative data are restricted
to information relevant for social security,18 but they annually cover around 2.7 million panel
observations from 1975 to the present for West Germany, and from 1992 for East Germany.
The data for regional employment by sector is available only from 1978 onward. Sector
information is based on NACE Rev. 1 classifications.
I use trade data from the United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD) Commodity Trade
(COMTRADE) database to measure import penetration in manufacturing between Ger-
many, China, and a group of countries economically similar to Germany between 1992-
2012.19 Trade flows are deflated to 2010 USD values using data from the World Bank. In
order to match the trade data and establishment data, I translate the SITC Rev. 3 product
codes from COMTRADE to ISIC Rev. 3 to NACE Rev. 1 at the two-digit level via the
correspondence tables provided by the UNSD and Eurostat RAMON.
In the counterfactual simulations, I use trade data from theWorld Input-Output Database
(WIOD). I use this second source of international trade flows to measure both manufacturing
and non-manufacturing flows in the world economy. The WIOD covers 40 countries, and a
model for the rest of the world for the period 1995-2011. Data for 35 sectors are classified
according to the ISIC Rev. 3, which I similarly correspond to NACE Rev. 1 at the two-digit
17This study uses the weakly anonymous Establishment History Panel (Years 1992 - 2014). Data ac-
cess was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment
Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and/or remote data access. Data documen-
tation by Alexandra Schmucker, Johanna Eberle, Andreas Ganzer, Jens Stegmaier, Matthias Umkehrer
(2018): Establishment History Panel 1975-2016. FDZ-Datenreport, 01/2018 (en), Nuremberg. DOI:
10.5164/IAB.FDZD.1801.en.v1.
18I.e. the structure of the workforce by wage, sex, age, German/non-German status, occupation in certain
classes, and a measurement of skill intensity.
19Specifically, the instrument group consists of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden,
Singapore, and the United Kingdom.
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level via the correspondence tables provided by the UNSD.
In order to avoid changes from the inclusion of East Germany, I use 1992 as the base
year. I use the period 1992-2002 to estimate the value of κig without the impact of Hartz,
and the period 2005-2012 to estimate the value of κig after the reforms.20 See Appendix 6
for more details on the construction of variables.
5 Estimation and Empirical Exercise
The ultimate goal is to study how the Hartz Reforms impacted the group-level changes in
welfare that stemmed from increased import penetration from China between 2005-2012. To
that end, I want to simulate the German economy before and after the Reforms’ effects on
the labor supply elasticities, κig. To do so, I need to estimate the labor supply elasticity in
the two periods, 1992-2002 in the pre-Hartz period vs. 2005-2012 in the post-Harz period.
This section details how I derive my estimates.
The estimation procedure is built from several pieces. First, I detail the construction of
the ADH instrument for trade penetration. I next establish the relevance of the instrument
for changes in employment shares in Germany, pˆiigs, which in turn affect the changes in
average group income per worker. I then demonstrate how to estimate κig from a structural
relationship in the model using the instrument. I present results under the assumption
κig = κ, and conclude by showing how the κˆ estimate changes with the arrival of the Hartz
Reforms.
20For robustness, I consider 1993 as a possible base year, and 2002 and 2003 as the “start” of the Hartz
period. Although the measurement of κig has some small variation depending on the period used, results
are similar. See Appendix 6 for details.
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5.1 Instrumental Variable Approachas an instrument for the above
import exposure, namely
In this section, I detail how to use data on Chinese import flows to serve as an instrument to
estimate κ through changes in sectoral labor allocations. An ideal estimating equation is one
where I can use variation in pˆiigs in order to estimate the κ parameter. To that end, define
the change in earnings per worker in group g by yˆig ≡ YˆigLˆig . Using this definition together
with Equations 3.8 and 3.10 implies
yˆig = wˆispˆi−1/κigs Aˆ
1/κ
igs . (5.1)
Note that this equation holds for each sector s. The problem with taking this equation
directly to the data is the endogeneity between the change in employment share, pˆiigs, and
the change in average group level income per worker, yˆig. In order to remedy this problem,
I need an instrument that affects group-level income through its effect on changes in labor
allocation, pˆiigs. I follow ADH in their focus on the effects of increasing manufacturing
import penetration from China on local labor markets.21 To define how groups of workers
are potentially affected by the rise of China during the time periods of interest, I construct
a measure of trade exposure at the sector level. In particular, I measure
∆ [import exposure]CHNst ≡
∆IMDEU←CHNst
LDEU,st
, (5.2)
where ∆IMDEU←CHNst denotes the change in the value of imports from China to Germany
between t and t + 1, and LDEU,st denotes the number of workers in sector s at time t in
Germany. Note that this regressor does not solve the endogeneity problem immediately, as
unobserved supply or demand shocks could affect both yˆig and the import exposure in a way
21In a robustness exercise, I include the expansion of the Eastern European market after the fall of the
Iron Curtain as in DFS. In line with their results in finding little “pull” effect, I do not find that the inclusion
of the Eastern European channel greatly affects my results.
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that would contaminate my estimation of the effect of trade shocks.
To that end, consider a group of countries economically similar to Germany in terms of
openness and size.22 Denote these countries by ‘OTHER’ with ∆IMOTHER←CHNst defined as
above, with the exception that the trade flows are into these OTHER countries rather than
Germany. I use these trade flows to define the instrument,
∆ [IV import exposure]CHNst ≡
∆IMOTHER←CHNst
LDEU,st
. (5.3)
The intuition behind the instrument is straightforward. The rise of Chinese international
trade is not an event that solely impacted Germany, and the rise in flows to the IV Group
from (e.g.) China’s accession into the WTO can serve as a valid instrument. Using these
flows captures the exogenous components of the China shock while remaining netural to the
potential shocks affecting both German region g’s performance and trade flows. Through
trade’s impact on labor allocations, I can estimate κ through two-stage least squares.
I use the changes in the labor share of the aggregated non-manufacturing sector in each
group, pˆiig,NM , to estimate κ. For robustness, I construct two different measures for labor
allocation based on employment shares and earnings shares, piig,NM = Lig,NMLig and piig,NM =
Yig,NM
Yig
respectively.
Table 1.2 reports the results for the first stage. The F-stats are large, and the estimated
coefficients are very similar whether the model uses employment shares or earnings shares.
As expected, larger inflows of Chinese manufacturing goods predict larger labor shares in the
non-manufacturing sectors: labor moves away from affected sectors into those less exposed
to the trade shock.
22Again, this instrument group consists of Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden,
Singapore, and the United Kingdom.
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Table 1.2: Instrumental Variable Results, 1992-2002
Measurement of IV uses: Emp. Share Earn. Share
βˆIV 0.0053*** 0.0043***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
F-statistic 81.36 57.07
N 210 210
R2 0.2812 0.2153
Notes: The independent variable for this regression is the instrument described in Equation 5.3. The dependent variable is is
given by pˆiig,NM =
Lˆig,NM
Lig
and pˆiig,NM =
Yˆig,NM
Yˆig
, respectively. A group is the set of full-time employees for a particular local-
labor-market-skill pair. The dichotomous skill variable measures “unskilled” full-time employees vs. all others. *** indicates
significance at the 1% level.
5.2 Reduced-form Impact of the China Shock
I next show how changes in trade exposures affects group-level income. To that end, I run
the regression
ln yˆig = α + βRF ln
∑
s∈M
Ligst
Ligt
∆[IV import exposure]CHNs + ig, (5.4)
where ∆[IV exposure]CHNs and yˆig are defined as above, and
Ligst
Ligt
gives the group’s relative
exposure to the trade shock in the manufacturing sector (M).23
Table 1.3 presents the results. My findings are consistent with the stories proposed by
ADH and DFS: Chinese import penetration tends to lower the average income of groups
most exposed in the manufacturing sector.
5.3 Estimation of κig
Having established the relevance of the IV strategy, it remains to be shown how I use this
approach to estimate κ. From Equation 5.1, I can take logs to establish
23That is, for the same change in import values in s, the effect of the instrument on group g will be
stronger the larger is g’s total exposure to manufacturing sectors, s ∈ M . Note that the trade exposure to
group g is necessarily zero for sectors outside of manufacturing.
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Table 1.3: Reduced Form Results, 1992-2002
Measurement of IV uses: Emp. Share Earn. Share
βˆRF -.0103*** -.0127***
(0.004) (0.003)
N 210 210
R2 0.0610 0.0771
Notes: The independent variable for this regression is given by pˆiig,NM =
Lˆig,NM
Lig
and pˆiig,NM =
Yˆig,NM
Yˆig
, respectively. The
dependent variable is given by yˆig =
Yˆig
Lˆig
. A group is the set of full-time employees for a particular local-labor-market-skill
pair. The dichotomous skill variable measures “unskilled” full-time employees vs. all others. *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
ln yˆig = ln wˆis − 1
κ
ln pˆiig,NM +
1
κ
ln Aˆig,NM ,
providing structual justification for the 2SLS regression equation,
ln yˆig = αi + βln pˆiig,NM + ig, (5.5)
where pˆiig,NM is instrumented by
∑
s∈M
Ligst
Ligt
∆[IV import exposure]CHNs .
The instrument, ∆[IV exposure]CHNs , is a valid instrument so long as changes in the
technology of the non-manufacturing sector are correlated with neither the share of man-
ufacturing employment nor the change in trade between China and the “Other” countries.
Formally, the exclusion restriction is that E[Zigig] = 0 so long as E
[
Aˆig,NMpiig,M
]
= 0 and
E
[
Aˆig,NM∆[IV exposure]CHN
]
= 0.
Table 1.4 presents the estimates for κˆ = − 1
βˆ
for the period 1992-2002. My estimates
range from 1.377 to 1.595 and are significantly different from zero. This result is consistent
with GRY (their estimates for the U.S. range between 1.95 to 2.15 in the baseline), as well as
several other studies estimating sectoral and/or occupational elasticities. While they follow
different methodologies than the one described here, [2], [53], and [?] estimate parameters of
productivity dispersion between 1.1 and 2.2.
In the next section, I demonstrate how a looser labor market – as from the Hartz Reforms
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Table 1.4: Estimates for κ, 1992-2002
Measurement of IV uses: Emp. Share Earn. Share
κˆ 1.595*** 1.377***
(0.184) (0.187)
First Stage F-statistic 81.36 57.07
N 210 210
R2 0.1739 0.1258
Notes: The independent variable for this regression is the instrument described in Equation 5.3 for pˆiigs =
Lˆigs
Lig
and pˆiigs =
Yˆigs
Yˆig
,
respectively. The dependent variable is yˆig . A group is the set of full-time employees for a particular local-labor-market-skill
pair. The dichotomous skill variable measures “unskilled” full-time employees vs. all others. *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
in Germany – can deliver κˆ′ > κˆ, which motivates my simulation exercise and welfare analysis
for different values of κ.
5.4 Estimation of κ Capturing the Hartz Reforms
Recall that the measurement of the sector productivity heterogeneity from shape parameter
κ also depends on prevailing labor market institutions, with κig → 1 ∀g representing the
case where labor cannot move across sectors. Consider two equally extreme cases that
could generate this phenomenon. First, consider the case where workers have any degree of
heterogeneity, including the case where all workers are identical and there is no scope for
comparative advantage as workers are equally substitutable across sectors, which is the case
when κ → ∞. But if labor policy is extremely inflexible, i.e. that workers cannot move
between sectors, my estimation procedure would estimate κˆ close 1.24 On the other hand,
consider the case where workers are extremely varied in their levels of comparative advantage,
such as the specific factors model. Even if labor market policy is extremely flexible, workers
do not move between sectors. In this case, I would still estimate the value of κˆ to be 1.25
It must be that estimates of κ capture components of both skill heterogeneity and labor
24Or that there would be no variation to identify in the limit.
25In this case, factors cannot produce in the other sector and therefore earn no income in that sector. Any
labor reallocation moves one-to-one with group income.
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Table 1.5: Estimates for κ, Before and After Hartz I-IV
1992-2002 2005-2012
Measurement of IV uses: Emp. Share Earn. Share Emp. Share Earn. Share
κˆ 1.595*** 1.377*** 4.499*** 4.614***
(0.184) (0.187) (0.175) (0.185)
First Stage F-Statistic 81.36 57.07 105.70 96.52
N 210 210 210 210
R2 0.1739 0.1258 0.2679 0.2694
Notes: The independent variable for this regression is the instrument described in Equation 5.3 for pˆiigs =
Lˆigs
Lig
and pˆiigs =
Yˆigs
Yˆig
,
respectively. The dependent variable is yˆig . A group is the set of full-time employees for a particular local-labor-market-skill
pair. The dichotomous skill variable measures “unskilled” full-time employees vs. all others. *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
flexibility.
With workers moving between sectors, it is unsurprising to find an estimate of κ > 1 in
the previous exercise. After 2003-2005, however, the Hartz Reforms reduced labor frictions
as described in Section 2, i.e. the reforms increased the flexibility of labor to move across
sectors. For a given level of worker heterogeneity, an increase in flexibility would raise my
estimate for the value of κ. Re-estimating κ between 2005-2012 answers whether the Hartz
Reforms had a meaningful impact on the degree to which German workers were able to
maximize the value from their comparative advantage amidst changes in wages due to trade.
Table 1.5 presents the results from the estimation exercise described in the previous
section for 2005-2012. For ease of comparison, the results from 1992-2002 are repeated.
Using employment (earnings) shares, my estimate of κˆ rises from 1.595 (1.377) to 4.449
(4.614) when estimated over the 2005-2012 horizon (even though the period is shorter!). I
interpret the rise in the parameter estimate as evidence for the effect of the Hartz Reforms
on labor mobility. As previously argued, I do not suggest that the reforms increase the
heterogeneity of ability in German workers, but rather they ease the transition of workers
between sectors, an effect that the model would be unable to otherwise distinguish.
I acknowledge that all of the change I measure in κ between the two time periods may
not be due to the Hartz Reforms, but I do contend that it is a good approximation. The
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labor market reforms in Germany were unprecedented, and the social welfare system did not
see another systematic overhaul before the end of the period. The Global Financial Crisis
is apparent in the data, but it does not appear to be driving the results.26 The substantial
movement out of the manufacturing sector after German reunification in 1992 should bias
my estimate for κ upward during the first decade, which would mute rather than enforce
my measurement for the effect of the Hartz Reforms on κ. I perform additional robustness
checks in Appendix 6 to address possible concerns about the starting year and the inclusion
of Eastern European trade.
6 Simulation Exercise and Welfare Analysis
Armed with my pre- and post-Hartz estimates of κ, I simulate the general equilibrium
model in the post-Hartz period using the pre-Hartz parameter value. This section answers
the question, “How would the gains from trade with China between 2005-2012 have been
distributed in the absence of the Hartz Reforms?” I use the embedded gravity equation of the
model to back out the shock in terms of exogenous changes in trade costs, then insert that
shock into the structural model to run counterfactual exercies. I use the model’s system of
equilibrium labor conditions in order to solve for the the matrix of equilibrium wage changes,
wˆis, which I use to characterize the aggregate and group-level welfare effects.
6.1 Estimating the China Shock
In order to answer how changes in labor mobility may have affected welfare outcomes, I need
a theory-consistent shock to trade costs and/or technology in order to induce the change in
wages that drive the welfare results. In this section, I show how to use the gravity side of
this model in order to calculate changes in trade costs, an approach that is orthogonal to
26Indeed, Germany has been credited for its mild response to the crisis.
26
the value of κ.27
Suppose trade costs are symmetric, i.e. that τijs = τjis ∀{i, j, s}, and that there are no
technology shocks, Tˆis = 1 ∀{i, s}. Then using Equation 3.9, I can back out the implied
change in Germany-China trade costs from the empirical change in trade shares between
any two years. Specifically, the gravity equation is given by
τˆijs = τˆjis =
 λˆijsλˆjis
λˆiisλˆjjs
− 12θs . (6.1)
I measure the empirical changes in trade shares for the period between 2005 and 2011,28
and use the θs values estimated in Caliendo & Parro (2015).29 In order to isolate the
Germany-China channel, I set τˆijs = 1 for all pairs excluding Germany-China. Note that
this assumption will tend to reduce the magnitude of my results at the group level. By
shutting down all other country-pair trade cost channels, I significantly reduce the scope for
relative wages to change from China’s opening to the rest of the world. Recall that all of
the group-specific variation in welfare relies on the change in real income coming exclusively
from changes in wages (for group {i, g} in sectors s ∈ S). However, by looking exclusively at
the Germany-China channel I can be more direct about the labor market institution effects
vs. trade effects.
Table 1.6 presents the results for each sector. Shocks are particularly strong in the
clothing sectors and in transportation equipment, consistent with findings on the growth in
the Chinese textile sector and relative robustness of the German auto industry.
27GRY calibrate changes in Chinese technology to match the change in trade shares between the U.S. and
China. Doing so requires taking a stance on the value of κ in the baseline calibration. For reasons of com-
parability, they use κ = 2 for the baseline calibration and then analyze changes in κ in their counterfactuals.
While they find their results are not sensitive to changes in the baseline calibration, my approach does not
rely on the value of κ in order to back out the trade shock.
28The WIOD’s last year of data is in 2011, so I choose the closest possible year to the 2012 end date.
29Anderson & Van Wincoop (2004) summarize existing evidence on the estimated trade elasticities across
sectors, finding θs between 4 and 9 (σs between 5 and 10). As would be expected given the form of Equation
3.12, higher values of θs reduce the magnitude of the effects through the Arkolakis et al. (2012) portion of
the equation. See Figure A.1 for the values of the individual θs.
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Table 1.6: Gravity Model Estimates for τˆCHN,DEU,s
Sector Estimated Shock
Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 0.8910
Textiles and Textile Products 0.8778
Leather and Footwear 0.8352
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 0.9955
Pulp, Paper, Printing, and Publishing 1.0123
Coke, Refined Petroleum, and Nuclear Fuel 0.9764
Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.8886
Rubber and Plastics 0.9067
Other Non-Metallic Mineral 0.9256
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 0.9826
Machinery, Nec 0.9009
Electrical and Optical Equipment 0.9275
Transport Equipment 0.8581
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling 0.9673
Aggregated Non-manufacturing Sector 0.8765
Notes: Changes in symmetric CHN-DEU trade costs as calculated in Equation 6.1.
6.2 Results
I plug the estimated changes in trade costs into the system of equations given by Equation
3.7 and solve for the counterfactual change in equilibrium wages in each sector-country pair.
From the wˆis matrix, I compute the model-implied λˆiis and pˆiigs for Germany and insert these
values into Equations 3.12 and 3.13 to calculate changes in welfare for individual groups and
in the aggregate, respectively.
Table 1.7 presents the results for my two estimated values for κ from Section 5 as well as
results for the theoretical limits, κ→ 1 and κ→∞. Turning first to the overall impact of the
China shock during the 2000s, in all cases the aggregate welfare implications for Germany
are positive, ranging from 0.144% to 0.223% (Column 2). Despite a different approach, this
finding is in the same neighborhood as Levchenko & Zhang (2012), who calculate welfare
gains of 0.226% for Germany from the opening of Eastern Europe.30 The aggregate welfare
gains fall as κ rises, as discussed in Section 3.4.
30In their baseline using κ = 2, GRY find WˆUS = 0.25% for θs = 5 during a different time span.
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Table 1.7: Welfare Effects of China Shock
κ Total WˆDEU
∏
s λˆ
−βis/θs
iis MeanWˆig MinWˆig MaxWˆig
→ 1 0.223 0.181 0.217 0.037 0.720
1.377 0.212 0.177 0.205 0.046 0.615
4.614 0.176 0.161 0.172 0.098 0.337
→∞ 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144
Notes: The first column displays the value of κ used for the simulation. The second column presents the total change in German
welfare 100(WˆDEU − 1) as in Equation 3.13. The third columns presents the Arkolakis et al. (2012) component of the welfare
change 100
(∏
s
λˆ
−βis/θs
iis − 1
)
for Germany. The third, fourth, and fifth columns present the mean 100
(
1
G
∑
g
Wˆig − 1
)
,
minimum min 100
(
Wˆig − 1
)
, and maximum max 100
(
Wˆig − 1
)
group welfare changes, respectively.
Columns 4, 5, and 6 give the mean, minimum, and maximum group welfare changes.
Total labor immobility, as is the case when κ → 1, causes groups with relatively high
manufacturing production to be hit harder, with the worst-off group gaining only 0.037%.
At the other extreme, when κ→∞ (workers are both identical and freely mobile), the mean,
minimum, and maximum collapse to the same value, as would be the case in EK or Costinot
et al. (2012). In this special case, the welfare changes are identical to those presented in
Arkolakis et al. (2012) (Column 3).31
Table 1.7 also answers the original question: How would the gains from trade with China
between 2005-2012 have been distributed in the absence of the Hartz Reforms? Using the
pre-Hartz estimate for κ between 2005-2012 predicts larger aggregate welfare gains at the
cost of greater between-group inequality (the range between the minimum and maximum
group welfare gains). In particular, the worst-off group would have gained 0.046% rather
than 0.098%, and the best-off would have gained 0.615% rather 0.337%. This doubling in
spread would have come at the benefit of higher aggregate welfare changes, improving from
0.176% to 0.212%.
Intuitively, this result is driven by the pattern of worker selection in Germany following
greater competition in manufacturing from China. Cheaper Chinese goods lowered the wages
for German workers in manufacturing, leading to the least productive workers in each sector
31Note that κ indirectly affects the multi-sector ACR term,
∏
s λˆ
−βis/θs
iis , even though the shock is con-
stant. This is because the value of κ affects the entire matrix of country-sector wages and thereby also the
expenditure shares, λˆiis.
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to select into their next-best sector of comparative advantage. This selection induces greater
competition in the non-manufacturing sector, which lowers wages in that sector as well. In
the case where frictions induce total factor immobility, wage losses are concentrated in the
manufacturing sectors and workers in the non-manufacturing sector gain from lower prices.
As the labor market becomes more elastic, workers can more easily reallocate from impacted
sectors and therefore narrow the distribution of welfare changes. In the case of an infinitely
elastic supply, the model predicts that welfare changes for all workers would be equal (as in
the model of EK).
These findings are not incosistent with the result that wage inequality increased during
the Hartz Reforms as in [18]. My finding is that the growing wage inequality between
2005-2012 is lower than it would have been without the Hartz Reforms. This result has
important implications for policy responses to the increase in global trade over the last few
decades. While the Hartz Reforms cannot be perfectly recreated outside of Germany, my
finding suggests that labor market policy targeting intersectoral labor mobility frictions has
the capacity to mitigate the losses to impacted areas.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a structural model with a simple mechanism through which labor
market liberalization policies can affect the distribution of welfare changes stemming from
trade by reducing frictions in the labor market. I use the model to evaluate how a set of
labor market policies between 2003-2005 in Germany known as the Hartz Reforms affected
the response of the German economy to rising manufacturing import pressure from China.
Using establishment-level data from the German Federal Employment Agency, I show how
the intersectoral mobility of workers rose in the period following these reforms. I use this
result to motivate a counterfactual exercise where, in absence of the Hartz Reforms, labor
supply curves are steeper and hinder the degree to which workers can reallocate away from
30
falling wages in import-competing sectors. By complementing my data with trade flows from
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and simulating the counterfactual world using
the structural model, I find that the reforms shrank the counterfactual gap in welfare gains
between the worst-off and best-off labor markets by more than 50%.
31
Chapter II: Real Exchange Rates,
Income Per Capita, and Sectoral
Input Shares
1 Introduction
Aggregate price levels are positively related to income per capita across countries, as illus-
trated in Figure 2.1a.1 The leading explanation for this observation is the Balassa-Samuelson
hypothesis, which postulates that productivity in tradable relative to non-tradable sectors
increases with income. According to this theory, the price level is determined by the price of
non-tradables, and high productivity in tradables leads to high wages and high non-tradable
prices. Indeed, Figure 2.1b shows a strong correlation between GDP per capita and the
aggregate price level, but not between GDP per capita and tradable prices.
1See Rogoff (1996) or Feenstra et al. (2015). The positive relation between relative prices and GDP per
capita is often referred to as the ’Penn Effect’, after Summers & Heston (1991).
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Figure 2.1: Real exchange rates and GDP per capita
(a) Price level of GDP
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(b) Tradables and non-tradable prices
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Notes: Price data is from the Penn World Table 9.0. GDP per capita at market prices is from the World Development Indicators.
In spite of its popularity, empirical evidence supporting the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis
is scarce. An important limitation is that, since sectoral productivities are rarely measured
in levels, the model’s predictions for relative price levels (i.e. real exchange rate levels) are
hard to confront with data.2 As a result, most of the empirical literature has focused on
studying the model’s predictions for the growth of the real exchange rate using proxies for
sectoral productivity growth, often with mixed results.3
This paper evaluates an alternative mechanism linking real exchange rates to GDP per
capita that relies on sectoral differences in input intensities rather than on cross-country
differences in sectoral productivities, and hence can be easily quantified using data on sectoral
input shares. The mechanism was first noted by Bhagwati (1984), who argued that if the
tradable sector is capital intensive, the relative price of non-tradables should be higher in
rich, capital-abundant countries where capital is relatively cheap. Our main contribution is
to extend this idea to incorporate sectoral differences in intermediate input shares, which
2Sectoral productivity measures are typically available in index form only.
3In particular, a large literature finds that the Balassa-Samuelson model does not do well in explaining
real exchange rates except in the very long run. See for example De Gregorio et al. (1994), Rogoff (1996),
Tica (2006), Lothian & Taylor (2008), and Chong et al. (2012).
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we show are much larger in tradable than in non-tradable sectors. The extended theory
indicates that, if the cost of labor relative to the cost of intermediate inputs is higher in rich
countries, so should be the relative price of non-tradables and the aggregate price level.
We quantify this mechanism by incorporating differences in input intensities across trad-
able and non-tradable sectors into a textbook open economy model.4 In the model, goods
and factor markets are competitive, and the price of tradables is equalized across countries.
Differences in GDP per capita across countries may arise either from differences in aggregate
or sector-specific productivity. The relationship between real exchange rate levels and GDP
per capita is shaped by three mechanisms. First, real exchange rates are shaped by sectoral
differences in intermediate input shares coupled with cross country differences in real wages,
as explained above. Second, real exchange rates depend on differences in capital shares
across sectors and cross-country differences in the stock of capital per capita, as proposed by
Bhagwati. Crucially, since these two mechanisms depend only on sectoral factor and input
intensities, and not on the relative levels of sectoral productivity, they can be quantified
directly using publicly available data. Finally, real exchange rates are also shaped by cross-
country differences in sectoral technology, as in the standard Balassa-Samuelson model. As
highlighted above, this effect cannot be quantified directly without data on sectoral produc-
tivity levels in each country.5
We show that the observed differences in input shares across sectors account for about half
of the elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to GDP per capita. In particular,
we write the real exchange rate of each country relative to the US as the sum of three terms
that capture the mechanisms described above. Differences in intermediate input shares
across tradable and non-tradable sectors imply an elasticity of the real exchange rate to
GDP per capita of 0.16, more than two-thirds of the 0.23 elasticity measured in Figure
4See for example Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996).
5In turn, measures of sectoral productivity levels can only be constructed as a residual using data on
sectoral relative price levels, as done by Inklaar & Timmer (2014). In contrast, our mechanism can be
quantified independently of the sectoral price data.
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2.1a.6 The elasticity implied by sectoral differences in capital shares is -0.05. Contrary to
Bhagwati’s hypothesis, the share of capital in gross output is actually larger in non-tradable
than in tradable sectors.7 Together, the sectoral differences in input intensities generate
an elasticity of 0.11, almost half the elasticity in the data. The residual component of the
slope coefficient (0.12) can be attributed to differences in sectoral technologies, as in the
Balassa-Samuelson model. We note, however, that this residual could be capturing other
factors driving real exchange rates not included in the model, such as differences in the price
of tradables across countries.8 Our main focus is to assess how much of the observed slope
between the aggregate price level and income per capita can be accounted for by the observed
differences in input shares, rather than on measuring the Balassa-Samuelson effect (which is
captured in our residual, potentially along with other factors).
Our proposed mechanism has strong implications for the behavior of industry-level real
exchange rates. It implies that, as income increases, industry-level prices should increase
relative to the aggregate price of non-tradables for industries where the share of interme-
diate inputs is lower than for the non-tradable sector as a whole. We find strong support
for this prediction using detailed industry-level price data from the International Compari-
son Program (ICP). We also calibrate the model to the industry-level data and show that
industry-level variation in input shares accounts for a significant fraction of the observed
industry-level real exchange rates. While the Balassa-Samuelson model can rationalize these
industry-level predictions, it can only do so through specific assumptions on how industry-
level productivities change with income. Instead, our mechanism delivers these predictions
from observed intermediate input coefficients for different industries.
We note that in our model, even under the assumption that there are no differences in
sectoral technologies across countries, differences in sectoral value-added productivity across
6Feenstra et al. (2015) obtain similar estimates of this elasticity using data from the PWT 8.0.
7In contrast, the share of capital in value-added is indeed slightly larger in tradable sectors. We note,
however, that real exchange rates are computed using prices of final expenditures, rather than ’value-added’
prices.
8We extend the baseline model to allow for differentiated tradable goods in Section 5.3.4.
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countries arise endogenously from sectoral differences in intermediate input shares coupled
with cross-country differences in aggregate productivity. This distinction between gross-
output and value-added productivity does not arise in the textbook Balassa-Samuelson model
without intermediate inputs. However, given value-added productivities in each country and
each sector, the two models have the same predictions for the level of the real exchange
rate. We highlight two advantages of starting from gross-output, rather than from value-
added production functions. First, differences in sectoral value-added productivities arise
endogenously from observed intermediate input shares, so they can be quantified directly
from aggregate data. Second, while sectoral differences in intermediate inputs intensities
have been ignored in the literature, real exchange rate measures are typically based on data
on final prices. Since final prices reflect the costs of all the inputs used in production (and
not just the value added costs), incorporating intermediate inputs in the analysis makes the
prices in the theory consistent with the price data.9
Our paper contributes to the long literature that studies the relationship between real
exchange rates and GDP per capita.10 Most of the empirical literature has looked at the
relationship between productivity and real exchange rate growth, but in most cases has
only found evidence of a long-run relationship such as cointegration.11 In a recent series of
papers, [?] and [?] use newly-constructed data on Price Level Indices for countries in the Euro
area to show evidence supporting the Balassa-Samuelson model. Our paper complements
these studies by proposing a mechanism through which differences in sectoral value-added
productivities arise endogenously from the differences in input intensities across sectors, in
the spirit of Jones (2011). Since the mechanism does not require data on the level of sectoral
productivity, we can quantify it both in growth rates and levels for a broad set of countries.
9Alternatively, one can start from value-added production functions, and work with ’value-added’ price
data. Herrendorf et al. (2013) and Bems & Johnson (forthcoming) are two recent examples that compute
’value-added’ prices.
10See Rogoff (1996) for a summary of the early literature on this topic, and Inklaar & Timmer (2014) for
recent evidence based on the new ICP data. Bergin et al. (2006) explain why the observed relation between
real exchange rate levels and GDP per capita may have changed through time.
11See for example Asea & Mendoza (1994), De Gregorio et al. (1994), Canzoneri et al. (1999) and Lee &
Tang (2007).
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Another related strand of literature uses microdata to study deviations from the law of
one price for detailed goods. Boivin et al. (2012) show that violations of the law of one price
arise even for reset prices using data from three online book sellers in Canada and the US.
Cavallo et al. (2014) study deviations of the law of one price for online prices of identical
goods sold by four large global retailers, and show that the law of one price holds very
well within currency unions. Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014) document that trade costs
and good-specific markups are an important source of deviations from the law of one price
for detailed tradable goods, and that these deviations tend to average out at the aggregate
level. In contrast to this literature, our focus is on understanding the correlation between the
aggregate price level and income per capita. To do so, we mostly abstract from deviations
of the LOOP for tradable goods at the micro level, which wash out in the aggregate as
noted by Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2014).12 We instead concentrate on the relative price
of non-tradable goods since its relation with income per capita is much stronger than for
the purely tradable component of prices, a view supported by Berka & Devereux (2013) and
Feenstra et al. (2015) among others, and by the PWT data in Figure 2.1b.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 uses a simple model to illustrate
our main mechanisms relating real exchange rate levels to GDP per capita. Section 3 de-
scribes a more detailed model incorporating capital as a factor of production and a richer
input-output structure and that will be used for our quantification. Section 4 describes the
data. Section 5 presents the quantitative results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Intermediate input shares and sectoral relative prices
This section develops a simple model to show how sectoral differences in intermediate input
shares can shape the relation between real exchange rates and GDP per capita. Consider
a small open economy that produces two goods, tradables and non-tradables, using labor
12Section 5.3.4 shows how to extend our baseline framework to allow for LOOP deviations for tradable
goods.
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and intermediate inputs. For the moment, assume that production does not use intermedi-
ate inputs that are produced in other sectors.13 The price of tradables is equalized across
countries and set as the numeraire, P T = 1 . The production function for good j is given
by:
Y j = ZA¯jLjθjM j1−θj ,
where Lj and M j denote labor and intermediate inputs used in sector j, θj is the share of
value added in gross output, and Z×Aj is a productivity term that has an aggregate and
a sector-specific component. All markets are perfectly competitive, so the price of good j
equals
P j =
[
ZAj
]−1
θj W, (2.1)
where Aj ≡ A¯jθjθj [1− θj]1−θj . We can write the relative price of non-tradables in terms of
tradables as a function of the wage as:
PN =
[
ATW θ
N−θT ] 1θN ,
where we normalized AN = 1 without loss of generality.14
Let P ≡
[
PN
]ω
denote the aggregate price level of GDP in terms of the tradable good,
where ω is the share of non-tradables in GDP. In addition, let the lower case of a variable
denote the log of the variable, with ∆x ≡ x − xw denoting the log of a variable relative to
the rest of the world. Noting that GDP per capita in this economy is given by the wage, we
can write the log of the price level relative to the rest of the world, q ≡ ∆p, as:
q = ω
θN
[
∆aT +
[
θN − θT
]
∆gdp
]
, (2.2)
13That is, non-tradables are not used in the production of tradables, and vice-versa.
14This equation follows from solving for Z and substituting back using equation (2.1).
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where we used the equality ∆w = ∆gdp.
Equation (2.2) relates relative price levels to cross-country differences in relative sectoral
productivities and cross-country differences in GDP per capita.15 It postulates that the price
level should be higher in countries that are relatively more productive in the tradable sector
(high aT ). In the Balassa-Samuelson model, it is assumed that aT is relatively high in rich
countries, which leads to a positive correlation between the relative price level and GDP per
capita. The equation also shows that, if the share of value-added is larger in non-tradable
sectors, θN > θT , prices should be higher in countries with a high level of GDP per capita,
even if there are no cross-country differences in sectoral productivity ∆aT = 0.
Of course, cross country differences in GDP per capita are endogenous, and in this model
may arise from either cross-country differences in aggregate or in sectoral productivity, Z
or Aj. In particular, using equation (2.1) for tradables to and substituting in (2.2) we can
write:
q = ω
θN
[θN − θT ] [∆aT + ∆z] /θT︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆gdp
+ ∆aT
 , (2.3)
where the difference in GDP across countries is given by the term in curly brackets. Given
data on ∆gdp, and irrespective of whether it arises from ∆aT or ∆z, we can implement
equation (2.4) and ask what is the difference in price levels arising from the difference input
shares. The observed differences in input shares alone imply that a log point difference in
GDP per capita should result in a ω
[
θN − θT
]
/θN log point difference in the price level.
Clearly, the overall elasticity of q with respect to ∆gdp will be larger if the differences in GDP
per capita arise from ∆aT . The focus of this paper is to quantify the part of the elasticity
15The relation between relative price levels and GDP evaluated at world prices (that is, PPP adjusted
GDP), gdpppp ≡ gdp− q, is:
q = ω
θ¯
[
∆aT +
[
θN − θT ]∆gdpppp] ,
where θ¯ ≡ ωθT + θN [1− ω]. We evaluate this relation in our robustness exercises.
39
that we can directly measure using aggregate data on input intensities (i.e., the part arising
from differences in input shares), rather than to estimate the elasticity of the price level
arising from ∆aT vs. ∆z.
Value-added production functions and mapping to the Balassa-Samuelson model
We can write the production functions in this model in value-added terms, rather than in
gross-output terms. Substituting intermediate input demands into the value-added produc-
tion functions, V j ≡ θjY j, we obtain
V j = BjLj, (2.4)
where Bj ≡ [ZAj] 1θj .16 The equation shows that even if there are no differences in gross-
output productivity across sectors, Aj = 1, sectoral differences in value-added productivity,
Bj, can arise endogenously from differences in the share of intermediate inputs in production,
θj. The intuition for this result is that, as noted by Jones (2011), intermediate inputs deliver
a multiplier similar to the multiplier associated with capital in the neoclassical growth model.
If the multiplier is greater in the tradable sector, θT < θN , this implies that a given increase
in aggregate productivity Z has a larger impact in tradable than in non-tradable output.
This observation makes clear that the theoretical predictions of the model for the real
exchange rate are isomorphic to a Balassa-Samuelson model with production functions given
by equation (2.4). We highlight two important advantages of incorporating sectoral differ-
ences in intermediate-input shares explicitly in the model. First, while sectoral differences
in intermediate input intensities have been ignored in the literature, real exchange rate mea-
sures are typically based on data on final prices.17 Since final prices reflect the costs of
all the inputs used in production (and not just the costs of the value added that goes into
production), incorporating intermediate inputs in the analysis makes the prices in the theory
16This follows from the input demands that minimize costs, M j =
[[
1− θj]ZA¯j] 1θj Lj .
17An important exception is Bems & Johnson (forthcoming) who estimate of value-added real exchange
rates.
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consistent with the prices that we measure in the data. Second, while the Balassa-Samuelson
model simply assumes how differences in sectoral productivities change with development
(i.e. the model assumes a correlation between BT/BN and GDP per capita), these differ-
ences can also arise endogenously from differences in the intermediate input shares across
sectors and differences in aggregate productivity Z across countries. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, differences in the relative level of productivity across sectors and countries are not
measured by statistical agencies -i.e. neither AT nor BT is measured in levels- which makes
it virtually impossible to directly quantify the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in levels. In
contrast, differences in the share of intermediate inputs across sectors are easily quantifiable,
so the input multiplier channel can be directly quantified. A back of the envelope calcula-
tion using equation (2.2) reveals that this channel is potentially large: using US values for
θN = 0.61, θT = 0.35, and ω = 0.84, indicates that, given relative sectoral productivities, the
elasticity of the relative price level of GDP with respect to relative GDP per capita is 0.38
vs. 0.23 in the data in Figure 2.1a. The remainder of the paper measures the importance of
this channel in a more detailed quantitative framework that incorporates capital as a factor
of production, allows for multiple non-tradable sectors and a richer input-output structure,
and allows for differences in factor shares across countries.
3 Quantitative framework
Production The production function for good j is given by:
Y ji = ZiA¯
j
i
[
Lj
1−αj
i
i K
j
α
j
i
i
]θji [[
MT,ji
]σTji [
MN,ji
]σNji ][1−θji ]
, (3.1)
where Y ji , L
j
i and K
j
i denote gross output, employment, and capital in country i and sector
j, MT,ji is the quantity of tradable intermediate inputs used in the production of sector j,
andMN,ji is a composite of non-tradable goods used in the production of j. θ
j
i and α
j
i denote
the share of value-added in gross output and the share of capital in value-added respectively.
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Note that production in sector j can potentially use both tradable and non-tradable inputs.
The share of tradable and non-tradable inputs used in sector j is given by σTji ×
[
1− θji
]
and σNji ×
[
1− θji
]
respectively, where σTji + σ
Nj
i = 1. As in the previous section, Zi ×A¯ji is
a productivity term that has an aggregate and a sector-specific component.
Prices Perfect competition implies that the price of good j is given by:
P ji = γ¯
j
iW
[1−αji ]θji
i R
αji θ
j
i
i
[[
P Ti
]σTji [
PNi
]σNji ][1−θji ]
/
[
A¯jiZi
]
,
where Wi and Ri denote the wage and the rental rate of capital in country i in units of the
tradable good and where γ¯ji is a constant.18,19 Taking logs we can write the log-price of good
j as:
pji = logγ¯
j
i − a¯ji + θjiwi + αjiθji [ri − wi] + σNji pNi
[
1− θji
]
− zi, (3.2)
where pji is the (log of the) price for good j, and pTi = 0 given the choice of the numeraire. Let
ωji denote the share of non-tradable good j in the non-tradable sector, so that
∑J
j=1 ω
j
i = 1.
We can write the log of the non-tradable price index as:
pNi ≡
J∑
j=1
ωji p
j
i .
In combination with (3.2) this implies
pNi =
¯¯aTi
θ¯Ni
+ θ
N
i − θTi
θ¯Ni
wi +
αNi θ
N
i − αTi θTi
θ¯Ni
[ri − wi] , (3.3)
18Note that we have assumed that the price of capital Ri is country specific. We evaluate the implications
of assuming that capital is internationally mobile (and its price is equalized across countries) in Section 5.3.5.
19The constant is given by
[
γ¯ji
]−1
≡
[[
1− αji
]1−αj
i
αji
αj
i
]θj
i
θ
jθj
i
i
[
1− θji
]1−θj
i
[∏
j′ σ
j′j
i
σj
′j
i
][1−θji ].
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where ¯¯aTi ≡ log
[
γ¯Ni /γ¯
T
i
]
+ a¯Ti − a¯Ni and θ¯Ni ≡ θNi + σTNi
[
1− θNi
]
+ σNTi
[
1− θTi
]
.20
Relative prices and GDP per capita We are interested in understanding the relation
between the aggregate price level and GDP per capita. Let 1 − α¯i ≡ WiLi/GDPi and
α¯i ≡ RiKi/GDPi denote the aggregate labor share and capital share in country i, where
Li =
∑
j L
j
i and Ki =
∑
jK
j
i are the aggregate labor supply and the aggregate capital stock.
Factor prices are related to factor supplies by:
Ri
Wi
= α¯i1− α¯i
Li
Ki
.
We can then write the (log) price of non-tradables in terms of tradables as:
pNi =
θNi − θTi
θ¯Ni
gdpi +
αTi θ
T
i − αNi θNi
θ¯Ni
ki +
¯¯¯aTi
θ¯Ni
, (3.4)
where gdpi is the log of GDP per capita measured in units of the tradable good, ki is the
log of the capital-labor ratio in the economy, and ¯¯¯aTi captures country-specific productivity
differences across the two sectors.21 Equation (3.4) links the price of non-tradables to GDP
per capita and the capital-labor ratio in the economy. The equation shows that, if the share
of intermediate inputs in gross output is relatively high in the tradable sector, θNi > θTi ,
the price of non-tradables increases with GDP per capita. Intuitively, as productivity grows,
labor gets more expensive relative to intermediate inputs, which increases the price in sectors
that use labor more intensively. In addition, if the non-tradable sector uses capital more
intensively, αNi θNi > αTi θTi , the price of non-tradables decreases with the capital-labor ratio
in the economy, ki.
20Note that, in contrast to the simple model from Section 2, the elasticity of pNi with respect to wi now
depends on the input-output coefficients σTNi and σTNi .
21That is, ki ≡ logKiLi , gdpi ≡ logGDPiLi , and ¯¯¯aTi ≡ ¯¯aTi + log
[
α¯
αNi θ
N
i −αTi θTi
i [1− α¯i]θ
N
i [1−αNi ]−[1−αTi ]θTi
]
.
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Decomposing real exchange rates We now decompose the determinants of bilateral
real exchange rates in the model. To facilitate comparisons with the data in Figure 2.1a we
define the real exchange rate as the price level of GDP in each country relative to the US.
The log of the price level of GDP in country i is defined as pi = ωNi pNi , where ωNi denotes the
share of non-tradables in country i’s GDP. Letting ∆xi ≡ xi − xus denote the log difference
of a variable relative to the US, we can write the log-price of GDP in country i relative to
the US, qi ≡ ωNi ∆pNi , as:22
qi = ωNi
θNi − θTi
θ¯Ni
∆gdpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Intermediate Inputs’
+ ωNi
αTi θ
T
i − αNi θNi
θ¯Ni
∆ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Capital-Deepening′
+ ωNi ∆aTi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Residual’
, (3.5)
where
∆aTi ≡
¯¯¯aTi
θ¯Ni
−
¯¯¯aTus
θ¯Nus
+
[
αTi θ
T
i − αNi θNi
θ¯Ni
− α
T
usθ
T
us − αNusθNus
θ¯Nus
]
kus +
[
θNi − θTi
θ¯Ni
− θ
N
us − θTus
θ¯Nus
]
gdpus.
Equation (3.5) decomposes cross-country differences in the price level into three terms. The
first term, labeled ’Intermediate Inputs’, captures the differences in aggregate price levels
that arise from sectoral differences in intermediate input shares coupled with differences in
GDP per capita across countries. It states that, if the share of intermediate inputs is larger
in the tradable sector, θNi > θTi , countries with higher GDP per capita should have a higher
price level. This effect is the main focus of this paper and is measured in the quantitative
section below.
The second term, labeled ’Capital-Deepening’, captures how cross-country differences
in the capital-labor ratio affect relative price levels, and states that the relative price level
should increase with the capital-labor ratio if the production of tradables is more intensive in
capital αTi θTi > αNi θNi . This mechanism was first highlighted by Bhagwati (1984). Note that
22Note that, in line with the price level index estimates of the ICP, our relative price level focuses on
weighted averages of relative price differences (
∑
j ω
j
i
[
pji − pjus
]
) as opposed to differences in the weighted
average or price levels (
∑
j ω
j
i p
j
i −
∑
j ω
j
usp
j
us).
44
if the share of value-added in the tradable sector is low enough, the price level can actually
decrease with the capital-labor ratio even if the capital share in value-added is higher in the
tradable sector αTi > αNi . Indeed, in contrast to what is postulated in Bhagwati (1984),
αTi θ
T
i < α
N
i θ
N
i for the vast majority of countries for which input-output data are available.23
Finally, the ’Residual’ captures differences in the price level that arise from cross-country
differences in sectoral technology, which encompass both cross-country differences in the
relative level of sectoral productivity A¯Ti , as in the Balassa-Samuelson model, and cross-
country differences in sectoral factor shares αji , θ
j
i , and θ¯Ni . These terms cannot be measured
directly from national accounts data, as it requires not only data on the relative level of
sectoral productivity, A¯Ti , but also data on the level of US GDPmeasured in units of tradables
(which requires taking a stand on the level of the dollar price of tradable goods).24 Note
that the residual also captures differences in the aggregate capital share in the economy α¯i.
These differences may arise even if the sectoral capital shares are identical across countries,
αji = αj, when there are differences in capital intensities across sectors and cross-country
differences in the sectoral composition of the economy.25
23Note that the production function in equation (3.1) does not separate land from other forms of capital.
If the price of land is higher in rich countries, and land is used more intensively in the production of
non-tradable goods, this would be an additional channel through which sectoral differences in input shares
generate a positive relation between price levels and income per-capita, reinforcing the mechanisms in this
paper. We do not to include land as a separate input of production since sectoral land shares and prices for
multiple countries are hard to come by. Valentinyi & Herrendorf (2008) estimate sectoral factor shares for
the US, and find that in the share of land is about 0.04 for tradable vs. 0.05 for non-tradable sectors, which
suggest that the quantitative effects of this mechanism may be limited. Note that separating land from the
other forms of capital would not affect the measurement of the ’intermediate inputs’ channel in equation
(3.5) (since separating land from other forms of capital would not affect our estimates of the value added
shares θji ).
24In addition, as mentioned above and highlighted again in Section 5.3.4, the composition of the residual
depends on how the model is closed on the demand side.
25If factors are sector-specific and preferences are not homothetic, the price of nontraded goods may rise
with GDP if the demand for nontraded goods rises with income. This ’Linder’ mechanism was studied
by Bergstrand (1991), and is reflected here in the fact that the aggregate labor share 1 − α¯i may increase
with income if higher income countries consume more non-tradables and the labor share is higher in the
non-tradable sector. Such mechanism would also be part of our residual. While quantifying this mechanism
its outside the scope of this paper, Appendix Figure E.1 shows no systematic relation between the aggregate
labor share and GDP per capita in the PWT data (see also Gollin (2002)).
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Real exchange rates and productivity differences: Equation (3.5) expresses cross-
country differences in price levels in terms of differences in observable variables, ∆gdpi and
∆ki, and a residual term that captures unobserved differences in sectoral productivity levels,
potentially along with other factors omitted from the model. Clearly, the differences ∆gdpi
and ∆ki, are endogenous, and may arise from cross-country differences in aggregate or in
sectoral productivities, Z or Aj. This subsection makes two additional assumptions that
allow us to rewrite equation (3.5) in terms of productivity differences, like we did in Section
2. In particular, if input shares are common across countries, θji = θj and σ
j
i = σj, and
the share of capital in value added is common across countries and sectors, αji = α, we can
rewrite (3.5) as:26
qi =
θ¯N
θ¯
∆a¯Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
Balassa-Samuelson.
+ ω
N
θ¯N
[
θN − θT
]  θ¯
N
θ¯
∆zi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aggregate
+ θ¯
N
θ¯
[
θN + σTN
[
1− θN
]]
∆a¯Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interaction

︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆[gdpi−αki]
. (3.6)
Equation (3.6) writes cross-country differences in price levels in terms of three terms captur-
ing: (i) cross-country differences in sectoral productivity levels (i.e. the Balassa Samuelson
effect), (ii) differences in aggregate productivity, (labeled ’Aggregate’), and (iii) the indirect
effect of sectoral productivity differences that arises from their interaction with sectoral dif-
ferences in input shares, (labeled ’Interaction’). The input channel highlighted in this paper
is given by from the sum of the last two terms, as the equation also shows that differences
in ‘value-added TFP’, ∆ [gdpi − αki] , arise both from differences in aggregate and sectoral
productivities, ∆zi and ∆a¯Ti .
3.1 Industry-level real exchange rates
We now derive the model’s implications for industry-level real exchange rates. From equa-
tions (3.2) and (3.4) we can write the price of any non-tradable good j as:
26See the Online Appendix for a derivation.
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pji = β
gdp,j
i gdpi + β
k,j
i ki + a
j
i ,
with
βgdp,ji ≡
[
θji − θNi
] [
1− σNNi
θNi − θTi
θ¯Ni
]
−
[
σNNi − σNji
] [
1− θji
] θNi − θTi
θ¯Ni
+ θ
N
i − θTi
θ¯Ni
,
and
βk,ji ≡ αjiθji + σNji
[
1− θji
] αNi θNi − αTi θTi
θ¯Ni
.
The log price in industry j relative to the US (i.e. the industry-level real exchange rate) is:
qji = β
gdp,j
i ∆gdpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Intermediate Inputs’
+ βk,ji ∆ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Capital-Deepening′
+ ∆aji︸︷︷︸
′Residual′
(3.7)
Equation (3.7) states that the slope of the industry-level real exchange rate with respect
to GDP should increase with the share of value-added in the industry θji ; a prediction we
verify in Section (5.2). Finally, we can write the price of non-tradable good j relative to the
average price of non-tradables, relative to the US as:
∆
[
pji − pNi
]
=
[
βgdp,ji − βgdpi
]
∆gdpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Intermediate Inputs’
+ β¯k,ji ∆ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Capital-Deepening′
+ ∆aji︸︷︷︸
′Residual′
(3.8)
with β¯k,ji ≡ θ
N
i −θji
θ¯Ni
[
αNi
[
σTNi + σNTi
[
1− θTi
]]
+ αTi θTi σNNi
]
. Equation (3.8) states that, as
GDP per capita grows, all else equal, industry-level prices will rise relative to the price of non-
tradables in industries where the share of intermediate inputs is relatively high, θji < θNi .27
27Clearly, if σNNi = σ
Nj
i , β
gdp,j
i > β
gdp
i only if θ
j
i > θ
N
i . More generally this relation will also depend the
degree to which industry-level inputs are non-tradable, σNji .
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4 Data
To evaluate the relation between relative prices and GDP per capita derived in equations
(3.5), (3.7), and (3.8) we need data on relative price levels, GDP per capita, and the stock of
capital per capita across countries. We also need to assign values to the share of value-added
in gross output for each country and sector, θji , the labor share in each country and sector,
1− αji , the intermediate inputs shares, σj
′j
i , and the share of non-tradables in GDP, ωNi .
Relative price levels, GDP per capita, and capital-labor ratios: We take GDP
per capita at market prices from the World Development Indicators Tables (WDI). Data
on relative prices come from the Penn World Table 9.0 (PWT). Our baseline relative price
measure is the price level index of GDP relative to the US, which is variable PL_GDP o in the
PWT.28 We focus on a subsample of 168 countries for which we have data in both the PWT
and WDI. We construct GDP per capita at PPP dollars from the PWT by taking the ratio of
real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (variable RDGPNA in the PWT) to population.
For the stock of capital per capita, we use the capital stock in PPP dollars (variable RKNA).
When looking at growth, we compute the growth rates of these per capita variables. We
complement these data with the benchmark ICP 2011 data containing sector-specific price
level indices and expenditure shares.29
Input shares and sectoral weights: Input-output coefficients come from the OECD
Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables, which provide input-output tables for 61 coun-
tries between 1995-2011. We classify sectors in the ICIO and the ICP into tradables and
non-tradables following Crucini et al. (2005).30 We compute θji as the ratio of value-added
to gross output in each sector, and the parameters σj
′j
i as the ratio of the value of inputs
28See Feenstra et al. (2015) for a description of the new PWT.
29While the benchmark PLIs in the detailed ICP data are defined relative to the world, we divide by the
US PLIs to work with price indices of consumption relative to the US.
30See Table E.1 in the Appendix.
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from sector j′ to the total value of inputs used in sector j. For the countries for which the
ICIO data is not available, we assign the parameter values of the average ICIO country.
Unfortunately, the shares of labor compensation in value-added, 1− αji , are not directly
observable in the ICIO tables. In particular, I-O tables report the share of compensation
to employees relative to value-added for each sector. It is well known that compensation to
employees understates labor compensation as it does not include payments to self-employed
workers.31 The PWT adjusts the labor income of employees to account for the income of self-
employed workers to obtain an aggregate measure of the labor share. We follow this approach
and rescale the sectoral ratios of compensation to employees to value-added that we observe
in the ICIO to match the aggregate labor shares reported in the PWT. In particular, for
each country in the ICIO we compute
1− αji =
Comp. to employeesji
Value addedji
× Labor comp.i/Value addediComp. to employeesi/Value addedi
, (4.1)
where the sectoral and aggregate ratios of compensation to employees to value-added come
from the ICIO, and the aggregate ratio of labor compensation to value-added is obtained
from the PWT. For countries not available in the ICIO tables, we impute the cross-country
average of the observed θji , σ
j′j
i and compensation-to-employees-to-value-added ratio, and
use equation (4.1) to obtain sectoral measures of the labor share that are consistent with
the PWT. In all cases, we use the shares as measured in 2011. The industries in ICIO are
mapped to the industries in the ICP program with the concordance in Appendix Table E.1.
Appendix Table E.2 reports the share of value-added in gross output, θji , for the countries
in our sample. Appendix Table E.4 shows the share of tradable intermediate inputs relative
to total intermediate inputs used in each sector. Non-tradable sectors are significatively
more labor intensive than tradable sectors for every country in the sample. They also use
relatively fewer tradable intermediate inputs than the tradable sectors. For the average
country, the share of value-added in gross output in tradable sectors is about half than in
31See Gollin (2002) and Feenstra et al. (2015).
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the non-tradable sectors (0.33 vs 0.54). This is consistent with the finding of Johnson &
Noguera (2017), who show that the value added content of trade has been falling dramatically,
especially in manufacturing sectors.
Finally, we compute the share of tradables in GDP, 1− ωNi , as the ratio of value-added
in the tradable sectors to total value-added. We use value-added data evaluated at pro-
ducer’s prices from the ICIO Tables. As discussed in Appendix E.5, by evaluating output
at producer prices, we do not include distribution margins into the price of tradable, and
prevent overstating the true share of tradable on the price index. Appendix Table E.5 re-
ports the division of the ICIO industries into tradables and non-tradable sectors. Within the
non-tradable sector, industry-specific ωji ’s are computed as the ratio value-added between
industry j to total value-added in the non-tradable sector.
5 Quantitative results
This section uses the framework in Section 3 to disentangle the sources of the cross-country
relation between real exchange rate levels and GDP per capita. First, we use equation (3.5)
to evaluate how much of the observed differences in price levels across countries can be
accounted for by sectoral differences in input shares coupled with cross-country differences
in GDP per capita. Second, we use equations (3.7) and (3.8) to test the industry-level
predictions of this mechanism. Third, we show that the results of this section are unchanged
if we instead focus on the relation between price levels and GDP per capita measured at PPP
prices, the relation between the growth of the price level and real GDP per capita across
countries, in a version of the model where tradable goods are differentiated across countries,
or if we assume that capital is fully mobile across countries.
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5.1 Price levels and GDP per capita
We first decompose the relation between aggregate price levels and GDP per capita fol-
lowing the decomposition in Section 3. In particular, for each country i, we compute the
terms labeled ’Intermediate Inputs’ and ’Capital-Deepening’ in equation (3.5), given by
ωNi
[
θNi − θTi
]
/θ¯Ni ∆gdpi and ωNi
[
αTi θ
T
i − αNi θNi
]
/θ¯Ni ∆ki respectively. Subtracting these two
terms from the observed relative price levels we can obtain the residual.
Figure 2.2 shows the results of this decomposition by plotting the ’Intermediate Inputs’
and ’Capital-Deepening’ terms along with the relative price levels observed in the data.32
The relation between aggregate price levels and GDP per capita can be mostly attributed to
sectoral differences in intermediate inputs shares, captured by the term labeled ’Intermediate
Inputs’. This term gives an elasticity of the relative price level with respect to GDP per
capita of 0.16, more than two thirds of the 0.23 aggregate elasticity observed in the data.
In contrast, sectoral differences in the share of capital in gross output, captured by the
’Capital-Deepening’ term, generate a small but negative elasticity of the price to GDP per
capita of -0.05. This is due to the fact that, in contrast to the postulate of Bhagwati (1984),
in the data the share of capital in gross output is higher in non-tradable sectors, that is,
αTi θ
T
i < α
N
i θ
N
i , even though αTi > αNi . Together, these two terms generate a slope of 0.11,
about half of the elasticity observed in the data. Appendix Figure E.2 plots the residual,
which among other factors captures country specific differences in sectoral productivity as
in the ’Balassa-Samuelson’ model. This term gives an elasticity of the price level to GDP
per capita of 0.12.33
In our model, differences in price levels across countries arise from cross-country differ-
ences in the price of non-tradable goods. In the Online Appendix we show that decomposition
in terms of non-tradables is similar to our main decomposition: differences in input intensi-
32To prevent cluttering the figure, the residual term is plotted separately in Appendix Figure E.2.
33Note that while the ’Intermediate Input’ term produces a relation between the price level and GDP per
capita, the relation between prices and GDP per capita in the data is not perfect, indicating that there are
other factors unrelated to differences in GDP per capita that can drive differences in price levels.
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ties (i.e. the combination of the ’Intermediates’ and ’Capital’ slopes) account for about half
of the slope of the relation between non-tradable prices and GDP per capita.
How much of the observed variation in our decomposition arises from by cross-country
differences in input and factor shares? In the Online Appendix we show that there is little
correlation between the coefficients θN , θT , and θ¯N and GDP per capita. We also show that
the relation between the ’Intermediate Inputs’ and ’Capital-Deepening’ terms and GDP
per capita is barely affected if we instead recompute the terms in our decomposition from
equation (3.5) under the assumption that all input and factor shares are common across
countries, and equal in value to that of the median country.
Figure 2.2: Real exchange rate decomposition
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5.1.1 Price levels and relative productivities
As noted throughout the paper, the advantage of the decomposition in (3.5) vs. that in (3.6)
is that cross-country differences in GDP per capita and capital per worker are observable,
whereas differences in sectoral productivity levels are not. In fact, cross-country differences
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in sectoral productivity levels can only be computed using the data on cross-country relative
price levels that we are trying to explain. This section uses the stronger assumptions imposed
for deriving equation (3.6) to gauge the importance of cross-country differences in sectoral
vs. aggregate productivities for aggregate price levels. As noted above, these stronger
assumptions do not substantially alter the results of our main decomposition.
We calibrate the aggregate and sectoral productivities under two alternative exercises.
In the first exercise, we back out cross-country differences in sectoral productivities from
data on relative prices. In particular, we calibrate ∆a¯T1i and ∆z1i to exactly match data on
value added TFP and real exchange rate levels using equations (3.6) and ∆ [gdpi − αki] =
θ¯N
θ¯
∆z1i +
[θN+σTN [1−θN ]]
θ¯
∆a¯T1i . By construction, plugging these values of ∆a¯T1i and ∆z1i back
into equation (3.6) will exactly reproduce the differences in price levels observed in the data.
The goal of this exercise is to decompose these differences into the different terms that
compose equation (3.6).
For our second exercise, we assume that there are no differences in sectoral productivities
across countries, ∆aT2i = 0, and calibrate cross-country differences in aggregate productivity
to match the observed differences in value added TFP, ∆z2i ≡ θ¯θ¯N ∆ [gdpi − αki]. We then
evaluate (3.6) under ∆z2i and ∆aT2i = 0. This exercise answers: how much of the observed
relation between prices and GDP per capita can be accounted for in a model where sectors
only differ in their input shares, and countries only differ in their aggregate productivities?
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Figure 2.3: Real exchange rate and productivity differences
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Notes: This figure plots the relation between the log of the price level of each country relative to the US and the log of GDP
per capita relative to the US. ’RER data’ refers to the relative price of GDP relative to the US obtained from the PWT 9.0,
already depicted in Figure 2.1a. “Exercise 1: Aggregate” and “Exercise 1: Interaction” report the values of the terms labeled
’Aggregate’ and ’Interaction’ in equation (3.6) when evaluated at ∆z1i and ∆a
T1
i . “Exercise 2: Aggregate+Interaction” reports
the value of (3.6) evaluated at ∆z2i and ∆a
T2
i .
Figure 2.3 plots the results of these two exercises. The first exercise shows that roughly
half of the intermediate input channel highlighted in this paper comes from the interaction
between aggregate productivity differences and sectoral differences in intermediate input
shares (i.e. the term labeled ‘Aggregate’, which generates a slope of 0.043), while the other
half comes from the interaction between sectoral productivity differences and intermediate
input shares (i.e. the term labeled ’Interaction’, which generates a slope of 0.053). The resid-
ual in this exercise is fully attributed to the direct effect of sectoral productivity differences
(i.e. the Balassa-Samuelson effect).
The second exercise underscores that a model where sectors only differ in their input
shares and countries only differ in their aggregate productivities can account for almost half
of the slope between relative prices and relative GDP per capita, provided that the aggregate
productivity differences are calibrated to match the observed differences on value added TFP.
Note that by construction, the price differences generated in this exercise are exactly equal
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to those generated by adding up the ‘Aggregate’ and ‘Interaction’ terms from exercise 1,
as both exercises all calibrated to match the data on ∆ [gdpi − αki] . This highlights that,
given data on the differences ∆gdpi and ∆ki, specifying the source of these differences is
inconsequential for the measurement of the intermediate input channel in this paper.
5.2 Industry-level real exchange rates
The mechanism highlighted in this paper makes sharp predictions for the behavior of industry-
level relative prices. There is wide variation in the share of intermediate inputs across non-
tradable industries. Appendix Table E.2 shows the share of value added in gross output for
the countries in ICIO for 7 non-tradable sub-sectors for which the ICP reports detailed price
indexes.34 The share of intermediate inputs in Education, Health, and Recreation is lower
than for the non-tradable sector as a whole, and is higher in Transport, Communication,
and Restaurants. An implication that can be gleaned from equation (3.7) is that the slope
of the price level of an industry with respect to GDP per capita should be larger the higher
is the share of value-added in the industry (i.e. the higher is θji ).
We first evaluate this prediction by running a regression of industry-level real-exchange
rates on relative GDP per capita and an interaction of GDP per capita with the value-added
share of the sector θji .35 We expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be positive:
the slope of the of the industry-level real exchange rate should be higher in industries for
which the share of value-added is high (and the share of intermediate inputs is low). Table
2.1 supports this result. The first column shows a significant positive relation between
the industry-level real exchange rates and GDP per capita, similar in magnitude to the
34See Table E.1 for our concordance. Appendix Table E.2 also reports these shares for each country in
our sample.
35More precisely, in our baseline regression in Column 2 of Table 2.1 we estimate:
qji = α+ β1∆gdpi + β2
[
θji ×∆gdpi
]
+ β3θji + ε
j
i .
where we obtain the industry specific value-added shares θji by matching the expenditure categories in
the ICP data from which the qji ’s are obtained to the industries in the Input-Output Tables manually, as
described in Appendix Table E.1.
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Table 2.1: Industry level relative prices and sectoral input shares
Dep var: qji (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆gdpi 0.235*** 0.241*** 0.419***
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0237)
θji ×∆gdpi 0.676*** 0.667*** 0.429***
(0.0694) (0.0643) (0.0859)
θji -0.906*** -0.974*** 0.615**
(0.171) (0.152) (0.297)
R-squared 0.266 0.476 0.630 0.775
Observations 1,127 1,127 1,127 399
CTY FE No No Yes No
IND FE No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *:
significant at 10%.
aggregate slope in Figure 2.1a. The second column adds the interaction of GDP per capita
and the sectoral value-added share. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive and
strongly statistically significant, in line with the predictions of our mechanisms. Moreover,
the R-squared of the regression increases from 0.266 to 0.476 once we add the interaction
term, indicating that sectoral input shares are important for understanding the variation in
industry-level prices. Column 3 adds country-level fixed effects, so that the interaction term
is identified from the variation in value-added shares across industries within countries, and
shows that the interaction terms is very similar under this specification. Finally, the last
column includes industry-level fixed effects.36 We continue to find a positive and significant
coefficient in this specification. We conclude that the reduced form evidence supports the
notion that sectoral differences in intermediate input shares shape the relation between real
exchange rates and GDP per capita.
An obvious challenge with our estimates in Table 2.1 is that we cannot control for
industry-level productivity differences across non-tradable sectors. This issue could be prob-
lematic if the industries with the higher use of intermediate inputs (lower θji ) happen to be
36For this specification, we exclude the countries for which we impute θji , and only include the set of
countries for which we can directly observe θji from the ICIO data.
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the ones for which the productivity gap between rich and poor countries is the largest. With
this in mind, we go back to our model and ask what is the relation between industry-level
prices and GDP per capita that is implied solely by the observed differences in input shares.
Figure 2.4 computes the terms labeled ’Intermediate Inputs’ and ’Capital-Deepening’ in
equation (3.7) for seven expenditure categories for which the ICP reports price data. It
shows that industry-level differences in intermediate input shares account for a significant
fraction of the relation between industry-level real exchange rates and GDP per capita. This
shows that the mechanism is quantitatively important in accounting for the real exchange
rates industry-by-industry.
Finally, equation (3.8) implies that as GDP per capita grows, non-tradable industry-level
prices should not only increase, but they should increase faster than the aggregate price of
non-tradables in industries where the share of intermediate inputs is lower than for the non-
tradable sector as a whole, θj > θN . Figure 2.5 evaluates this prediction. It shows the price of
each industry relative to the aggregate price of non-tradables in the data vs in the observable
terms in the model. In particular, we compare data on relative prices to the sum of first
two terms in equation (3.8), ignoring the ’Residual’ term. Despite the fact that the mapping
between the industry categories in the ICIO and the expenditure categories in the ICP data
is imperfect, the figure shows that the price of each industry relative to the aggregate non-
tradable price index in the data is positively correlated to that in the model for the Health,
Education, Transport, Restaurants, Communication and Construction industries, although
for Construction this relation is not statistically significant. In contrast, the industry-level
differences in input shares do not generate much variation across countries in the prices of
Recreation relative to the price of non-tradables. Overall, the mechanism is successful in
matching the relation of the relative industry level prices and GDP per capita.
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Figure 2.4: Industry-level real exchange rate decomposition
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Figure 2.5: Industry-level relative prices: Data vs. model with common sectoral technologies
across countries
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5.3 Robustness
5.3.1 Relative prices and GDP per capita evaluated at PPP prices
This section shows that our quantitative results do not change if we focus on the relation
between the real exchange rate and GDP measured in PPP dollars. With this in mind, we
write differences in the relative price level as a function of the difference in GDP per capita
evaluated as US prices, gdppppi ≡ gdpi − qi:
qi = βgdp
ppp
i ∆gdp
ppp
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Intermediate Inputs’
+ βki ∆ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Capital-Deepening′
+ ∆¯¯ai︸︷︷︸
′Residual’
, (5.1)
where the elasticities are given by:
βgdp
ppp
i =
ωNi
[
θNi − θTi
]
θ¯Ni − ωNi [θNi − θTi ]
,
and
βki =
ωNi
[
αTi θ
T
i − αNi θNi
]
θ¯Ni − ωNi [θNi − θTi ]
.
In the Online Appendix (Figure OA.4.), we evaluate the terms in this decomposition and
show that the sectoral differences in input shares account for about half of the elasticity
between the real exchange rate and PPP adjusted GDP per capita seen in the data (0.12 vs.
0.24).
5.3.2 Real exchange rates and GDP growth
We now evaluate the model’s prediction for the growth of the real exchange rate. Taking
differences across time in equation (5.1) and using hats to denote log-changes across time,
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we obtain an expression for the change in the real exchange rate:
qˆi = βgdp
ppp
i ∆ĝdp
ppp
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Intermediate Inputs’
+ βki ∆kˆi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Capital-Deepening′
+ ∆ˆ¯ai︸︷︷︸
′Residual’
(5.2)
Equation (5.2) establishes that, if θNi > θTi , fast growing countries should appreciate. In
the Online Appendix (Figure OA.5.) we compare the terms in equation (5.2) to the growth
of the real exchange rate observed in the data, and show that sectoral differences in input
shares account for about half of the elasticity of the growth of the real exchange rate to the
growth of real GDP over the 1997-2014 period.
5.3.3 Alternative classifications of the tradable sector
This section re-evaluates the results of Section 5.1 under an alternative classification of
industries into tradables and non-tradables. In particular, we follow the macro-economic
database of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (AMECO) and classify the Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels, Restaurants, Trans-
port, Utility, and Storage industries as tradables. In the Online Appendix, we plots the
decomposition of equation (3.5) using this classification (Figure OA.6.), and show that dif-
ferences in intermediate input shares still account for about half the slope of the relation
between the real exchange rate and GDP per capita using this alternative classification.
5.3.4 Differentiated tradable goods and deviations from the law of one price
We now show how to extend our baseline model to allow for differentiated tradable goods
and deviations from the law of one price. In particular, assume that tradable goods are
differentiated by country of origin. We continue to assume the production functions from
Section 3, but assume that trade between countries i and n is costly and subject to iceberg
trade costs τin > 0 for i 6= n, and τii = 1. t
Final good producers in each country i aggregate tradable intermediates from different
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source countries according to the aggregator
GTi =
[
N∑
n=1
ω
1
ρ
niY
T
ni
ρ−1
ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
, (5.3)
where Y Tni denotes country i′s absorption of tradable good from country n, ρ is the elasticity
of substitution across tradable goods from different source countries, and the parameters ωni
control the share of goods from country n in total absorption of tradables by country i. The
price of the tradable bundle consumed in country i is then given by:
P Ti =
[
N∑
n=1
ωni
[
ϕTni
]1−ρ] 11−ρ
, (5.4)
where ϕTni denotes the price of the tradable product produced in country n and consumed in
country i, and the parameter ωni controls the trade shares. Note that, because of the iceberg
trade costs, this price varies across destinations, so that the law of one price does not hold.
Sales from country n into country i are given by:
ϕTi Y
T
ni = ωni
[
ϕTni
P Ti
]1−ρ
P Ti G
T
i . (5.5)
The Online Appendix fully describes this version of the model, characterizes the equilibrium,
and shows that in this case the real exchange rate can be written as:
qi = βgdpi ∆gdpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
’Intermediate Inputs’
+ βki ∆ki︸ ︷︷ ︸
’Capital-Deepening’
+ βpi ∆pTi + β
ϕ
i ∆logϕTii + ∆ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
’Residual’
, (5.6)
with βgdpi ≡ ω θ
N
i −θTi
θ¯Ni
, βki ≡ ωα
T
i θ
T
i −αNi θNi
θ¯Ni
, βpi ≡ 1 − ω 1−[θ
T
i −θNi ]
θ¯Ni
, βϕi ≡ ωθ¯Ni , and ∆ai ≡
γ
θ¯Ni
∆log
[
γ¯Ni A¯Ti
γ¯Ti A¯Ni
]
. Equation (5.6) states that, in addition to the ’Intermediate Inputs,’ ’Capital-
Deepening,’ and ∆a terms already present in equation (3.5), the residual now includes dif-
ferences in the price of tradable across countries, ∆pTi and ∆logϕTii. Note, however, that the
coefficients βgdpi and βki , have not changed. That is, the part of the elasticity between GDP
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per capita and the aggregate price level that can be attributed to sectoral differences in input
shares in this model would be the same that would be attributed in our baseline model of
Section 3. Incorporating differentiated tradable inputs does affect the interpretation of the
residual.
5.3.5 Tradable capital
Finally, we evaluate the model’s prediction under the alternative assumption that capital is
mobile across countries, as in Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996). In this case, Equation (3.3) can be
written as:
pNi =
¯¯aTi
θ¯Ni
+
θNi
[
1− αNi
]
− θTi
[
1− αTi
]
θ¯Ni
wi +
αNi θ
N
i − αTi θTi
θ¯Ni
r∗,
where r∗ is the international rate of return to capital. Following the steps from Section 3,
we can write the price level in country i relative to the US as
qi = ωNi
[
1− αNi
]
θNi −
[
1− αTi
]
θTi
θ¯Ni
∆gdpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Input shares′
+ ωNi ∆a¯rTi︸ ︷︷ ︸
′Residual’
, (5.7)
where
∆a¯rTi ≡
aTi
θ¯Ni
− a
T
us
θ¯Nus
+
[
αTi θ
T
i − αNi θNi
θ¯Ni
− α
T
usθ
T
us − αNusθNus
θ¯Nus
]
r∗
+
θNi
[
1− αNi
]
− θTi
[
1− αTi
]
θ¯Ni
− θ
N
us
[
1− αNus
]
− θTi
[
1− αTus
]
θ¯Nus
 gdpus.
Note that in this case, the coefficient on ∆gdpi depends on the sectoral differences in the
labor share in gross-output,
[
1− αNi
]
θNi −
[
1− αTi
]
θTi , rather than on the sectoral differences
in intermediate input shares, θNi −θTi .We note that in the data, however, sectoral differences
in the share of labor in gross output arise primarily from sectoral differences in the share of
value added in gross output, θji , rather than from sectoral differences in the labor share in
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value added,
[
1− αji
]
.
In the Online Appendix (Figure OA.7.), we compare the term labeled ’Input shares’ to
the real exchange rate observed in the data, and show that sectoral differences in input shares
account for almost half of the elasticity of the real exchange rate to GDP per capita.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a mechanism to account for the relation between real exchange rates
and GDP per capita. If the share of intermediate inputs in the production of tradables
is relatively high and the price of tradables is equalized across countries, the price of non-
tradables should increase with GDP per capita. The intuition is that the input multiplier
will be larger for tradables in this case. Since this mechanism acts independently of the
differences in the level of productivities across sectors, it can be easily evaluated using input-
output data. We show that differences in input shares across tradable and non-tradable
sectors can account for about a half of the elasticity of real exchange rates to income per
capita.
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Chapter III: Services Trade and
Internet Connectivity
1 Introduction
Long records in the exchange of goods across countries have led much of the trade literature
to focus on trade in goods, rather than services. But as services play a larger and larger
role in modern economies - and data become increasingly available - it is a reality that trade
models must account for the change in composition. The share of services in trade volumes
has been rising over the last three decades, and policy makers view the service sector as a key
to economic growth, export competitiveness, and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2010). At
the same time, the advent of the Internet in the late 1980s has connected people all around
the globe, making it easier to communicate and exchange digital data.
Anecdotally, the connection between Internet accessibility and the exchange of services
is already prevalent. Call centers in India manage US tech problems from thousands of miles
away, Airbnb makes traveling abroad cheaper and easier, insurance policies are traded across
borders by firms halfway across the globe, and Netflix brings international entertainment at
the click of a button. But capturing the effect of the Internet in economic data can prove
difficult, especially when thinking internationally. Using historical data on the advent of
the Internet and its international spread helps relate connectivity to the growth in bilateral
service exports.
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This paper explains the growth in international services trade through rising Internect
connectivity in a standard gravity setting. The novelty of my approach is in creating a
database of the system of underwater fiber-optic cables (Figure E.3) to measure the degree of
country interconnectivity. These cables make the transfer of data in large quantities between
countries possible; 99% of international data traffic between countries travels through the
underwater system. By analyzing the growth in the cable system, I answer the question,
“Can bilateral Internet connectivity explain the growth in services trade in recent decades?”
Using data on the capacity1 of these fiber-optic cables, I find that a one percentage point
increase in connectivity correlates to a 0.25-2.25 percentage point increase bilateral exports
in data-intensive services.
The value of my approach is twofold. The first is that the growth in the fiber-optic cable
map provides some sense of bilateral connectivity. Though it will take a careful explanation
of how international data flow works, the result is that my exercise returns an estimated
coefficient for the strength of the connection between countries X and Y rather than more
top-down approaches based on the number of Internet users or registered domain names. To
clarify, consider the case of US connectivity with India and Japan. Large parts of India have
low Internet access (18.0/100 persons in 2014), but Japan is very well-connected (90.6/100).
Using this top-down approach, one might guess that Japanese services exports to the U.S.
dwarf Indian services exports to the U.S. by 5-to-1. But the true ratio was 3-to-1 by 2008
and has continued to shrink. The reason why is that Electronic City in Bangalore is almost
universally connected to the Internet (even if the rest of the country is not), and it has a
high-capacity connection to the US through the submarine cable network.
The second benefit is that my point estimate provides a coefficient for the growth in
trade that is targetable by policy and infrastructure. With more abstract approaches to
international connectivity, the policy lever to encourage services trade is less clear. In my
exercise, the answer is to build more capacity. To establish causality, I perform a sepa-
1While full detail will come in Section 2, “capacity” gives a sense how much data can be transferred
between two points.
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rate exercise, wherein I apply the “routing” identification strategy of Chandra & Thompson
(2000), Michaels (2008), and Fajgelbaum & Redding (2014). Whereas my above-mentioned
results tie together bilateral connectivity and services trade growth, there is an obvious en-
dogeneity problem: countries build submarine cables between one another with the intention
of increasing capacity, possibly for trade in services. I seek to show an effect where cable
connectivity is unexpected. The “routing” idea is as follows: suppose Country A wants to
connect to some Country C, and vice versa. To do so, they have to pass through Country
B. Though Country B has made no plans of its own to connect to Country A and Country
C, it now has access to the cable system. I then measure whether B’s service trade with A
and C grows.
While cables between North America and Europe and between East Asia and North
America came online very quickly, Western Europe was without the reliability of a high-
capacity fiber-optic undersea cable to Eastern Asia until recently. Building such a cable,
such as the FLAG Europe-Asia cable in 1997, necessitates stopping points in Egypt and
along the southeast Asian coast. I find that increasing cable capacity by 1 percentage point
yields a 2.25 percentage point increase in data-intensive services exports along the cable line
in the case of Egypt, or a 1.82 percentage point increase in a broader set of countries along
the cable lines.
My research is consistent with previous papers providing evidence on the association
between Internet connectivity and trade in services. Freund &Weinhold (2002, 2004) present
evidence that Internet connectivity is related to growth in services trade, in terms of both
exports and imports, where their connectivity measure is the number of web hosts attributed
to each country. A more recent paper by Bojnec & Fertőo (2010) relates Internet connectivity
to manufacturing trade, where the relevant variable is number of Internet users per country.
Their results show that Internet access is related to better access to information, an increase
in competition, and a reduction of trade costs. Guerrieri & Meliciani (2005) also address the
relationship between communications technologies and producer services. A recent paper
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by Eichengreen et al. (2016) relates cable connectivity and electronic currency trading, but
their focus is on the foreign exchange market.
My work also contributes to the research on the relationship between information and
trade of Steinwender (2014). She shows that the establishment of the transatlantic telegraph
in 1866 allowed for price information to move from the UK to the US nearly instantaneously, a
huge improvement from waiting for the next ship to make the journey across the Atlantic and
deliver new price information. Average trade flows increased after the telegraph transmitted
data on demand shocks more quickly. It is my goal to extend this type of analysis into the
Information Age.
Lastly, my work adds to the “gravity” literature of international trade. I augment the
empirical approach by providing a time-dependent, bilateral measure of connectivity for
services exports. My results are consistent with one where submarine cables reduce trade
costs between countries. In this view, bilateral connectivity makes certain services cheaper
to export and incentivizes growth in industries with relatively high data requirements. My
modeling will also be consistent with the emerging literature on the econometric issues with
zeros in trade data, e.g. Silva & Tenreyro (2006), that I will address in robustness checks.
The map of the discussion is as follows. Section 2 details the workings of the Internet
and data transfer, catalogs the history of submarine cables, and explains the importance of
modern day fiber-optic cables. Section 3 explains the data. Section 4 explains my estimation
strategy and presents results. Section 5 suggests some extensions of my work. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Internet and Cable History
Before presenting the model, it will aid the reader to have a fuller understanding of the
relevant history of long-distance data transfer and how the Internet works.2
2What will be presented here is still a simplification. For a more thorough explanation, I would
suggest Rus Schuler’s White Paper on the Internet (https://web.stanford.edu/class/msande91si/www-
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First, a few words of terminology will help. A bit is a zero or a one. All data are made up
of bits: 8 bits are a byte, 1,024 bytes are a kilobyte, 1,024 kilobytes are a Megabyte (MB),
1,024 MB are a Gigabyte (GB), and 1,024 GB are a Terabyte (TB). An email is on the order
of a handful of kilobytes, whereas a PDF of this paper is a few MBs. A present-day laptop’s
disk holds around 1TB or more. A bit-rate is a measurement of bits-per-time, which is the
data equivalent of measuring miles-per-hour – X bits moving at Y bits-per-second tells you
how long it takes to get those bits between two locations. Bandwidth refers to the maximum
bit-rate of available or consumed information capacity. Bandwidth is also rate – the bit-rate
of a given medium is capped by the available bandwidth. The rate of successful delivery
over a communication channel, such as a cable, depends on the limitations of this underlying
medium (copper cables versus fiber-optic ones), the available processing power of the system
components (how good your computer is), and end-user behavior. Sending an email doesn’t
require much bandwidth, but a Skype call does.
If two computers want to “talk” to each other, say via email, there must be some con-
nection between them.3 Each computer has an Internet Protocol Address (IP Address) and
sends messages through a series of interconnected routers to another computer. In Figure
3.1, a computer at IP address 1.2.3.4 can transfer data to the computer at IP address 5.6.7.8
through a Network Access Point. In my international case, think of Network Access Points
connected to each other through the undersea cable network. No matter the hardware at
either end of the connection, the underlying medium (the cable) will dictate the bandwidth
that is available between two end users. I’m interested in measuring the value of (and the
growth in) the bandwidth of these cables, which I will refer to throughout the paper as the
cable’s “capacity.”
The last bit of subtlety about bandwidth is in how it’s measured: bits per second from
point A to point B. You could put a bunch of hard drives in a jet and transfer a lot of bits
per second from France to Egypt, but if you’re swapping messages a conversation could only
spr04/readings/week1/InternetWhitepaper.htm).
3Satellites account for less than 1% of international data flow and are often used for very remote locations.
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Figure 3.1: Organization of Data Transfer
ISP stands for Internet Service Provider, NSP stands for Network Service Provider, and NAP stands for
Network Access Point. NAPs are also known as Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).
Source: https://web.stanford.edu/class/msande91si/www-spr04/readings/week1/InternetWhitepaper.htm
progress after each time the jet landed. Cables, on the other hand, can transmit very quickly
but in smaller quantities. But therein lies the value of modern fiber-optic cables: high speeds
and high bandwidth.
While countries have been connected via telegraph and coaxial telephone cables since
the first transatlantic cable in 1866, the advent of fiber-optic cables allowed for high enough
bandwidth in order to make some services trade viable. The first copper wires could transfer
10-12 words per minute; now businesses thousands of miles apart can interact over Skype.
Fiber-optic cables use lasers in a glass tube that permit higher signal speeds (∼200,000
km/s) at higher capacities than their predecessors. TAT-8, the first submarine fiber-optic
cable, connected France, Britain, and the US in late 1988 with a capacity of 40,000 telephone
channels, an order of magnitude increase in capacity over contemporary coaxial cables.
The new fiber-optic cables were still not without problems, however. Initial fiber-optic
cables were attacked by sharks due to a lack of electrical shielding. Fishing trawlers and
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anchors would still regularly break cables. To adapt, cables were woven in self-healing fiber
rings to increase redundancy (and thus reliability). Cables began being buried in the seabed
floors to avoid human destruction. PTAT-1 and cables that followed it were fitted with
shielding to avoid becoming fish food. Around the same time, the development of submarine
branching units allowed multiple destinations to be served by a single cable. The world was
more and more becoming connected by reliable, high-capacity cables that far outstripped
the previously laid coaxial cables.
The submarine fiber-optic cable system laid mostly after 1990 represents a discontinuous
jump in speed and capacity from its coaxial and telegraphic predecessors. Cables are still
occasionally broken by anchors and natural disasters, but the incidence of submarine cable
faults is very low (0.44 faults per 1000km per year after 1985 vs. a 1991 report of 2.13 for
conventional buried cables). As a result, the construction of fiber-optic cables between two
countries provides a reliable, high-capacity avenue for data transfer. In the empirical section,
I will show that the country linkages provided by these cables is correlated with increased
exports of data-intensive services.
3 Data
Data on the undersea fiber-optic cables come from several sources. My primary source
is TeleGeography’s Global Bandwidth research, a telecommunications market research and
consulting firm whose primary research areas include international Internet networks, un-
dersea cables, capacity, and long-distance traffic. They provide information on active and
planned submarine cable systems with a maximum upgradeable capacity of at least 5 Gb/s,
including ready-for-service date, length, owners, and landing point. As of the writing of this
paper, there are data on 347 extant and planned cables, beginning in 1989.
These data are supplemented by the Submarine Cable Almanac, put together by the
Submarine Telecoms Forum. Remaining possible gaps in cable lines and cable capacities
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were scraped from http://www.cablemap.info/ and cable-specific websites.4 I end up with
a final sample of 254 cables that are relevant to my study (I exclude future planned cables,
cables only connecting small island chains outside of my study, etc.). Wherever available, I
include data on the capacity of each cable. In general, I am able to find the capacities of all
large and major cables, though data on older and smaller cables often lack reliable measures
of capacity. As a result, my usable sample for capacity comprises 138 cables with measures
of available bandwidth.
To measure connectivity, I use the cable data in two different ways. The first is to use
the broadest set of information available, namely the raw number of cables and the countries
they connect. In this case, there will be higher connectivity between countries for which
there are a more cables: this measure is an integer value. The second measure uses all the
available capacity data. Since cables range in capacity by two orders of magnitude, a more
accurate measure of connectivity would be to use the sum of these capacities for any country
pair. For further detail on these two measures, see Appendix 6.
The services trade data come from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), which
is a collaborative effort between the World Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, United Nations Statistical Division, and World Trade Organization. These
data comprise bilateral exports/imports between country-pairs on trade partners around the
globe by BOP disaggregation. I perform my analysis at the 2-digit and 3-digit levels and
find similar results. While data at the 3-digit level are more precise, the drawback is that
many countries do not report trade flows at this level of specificity. As such, I use the 2-digit
in all cases when describing my results. See Table E.6 for a full list of countries and Table
E.8 for a list of sectors.
Ex ante one might expect that Internet access has different effects for different service
industries; Skype doesn’t make it easier to give an intercontinental haircut. To capture this
idea, I separate services into two groups: data-intensive services (DIS) and all else (non-DIS).
4E.g. http://www.smw3.com/ for SEA-ME-WE 3.
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To determine which sectors are “data-intensive,” I use the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) to measure the input ratio of telecommunications in each sector. I find that financial
services, computer & information, and other business services are the most data dependent.5
My estimation strategy will use a dummy for DIS interacted with connectivity to test if
there is a different effect for these sectors.
The goods trade information comes from the World Trade Flows data compiled by Robert
Feenstra of the Center for International Data. These data similarly comprise bilateral ex-
ports, though I lack the sector break-out that is available for our services data.
4 Estimation
As mentioned above, one can view the change in cable connections and capacity to be akin
to a time-varying change in the distance variable in a traditional gravity model. I rely on the
source-destination-year variation in the cable network in order to estimate the correlation
between inter-country service exports and connectivity. In order to soak up the variation due
to country size, cultural similarities, geography, and other covariates, I include fixed effects
at the source-sector-year level, the destination-sector-year level, and the source-destination-
sector level.
Recall that the goal is to measure the effect of the variability in fiber-optic connections
between countries. This variance occurs over time, t, between a source country, i, and a
destination country, n, for all sectors, s, in a given pair. I therefore prefer an estimating
equation taking the stochastic form
Xinst = β0 cablesαint eθinsdins+θistdist+θnstdnsteηinst , (4.1)
5In particular, I find Financial Intermediation, Other Business Activities (which includes Computer and
Related Services), and Air Transport to have the largest inputs from the telecommunication sector. The
relevance of Air Transport is driven almost entirely by the United States in the WIOD sample, so I exclude
it.
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or, taking logs,
ln(Xinst) = ln(β0) + α cablesint + θinsdins + θistdist + θnstdnst + ηinst, (4.2)
where Xinst represents exports from i into n in esctor s at year t, cablesint represents a
measure of cable connectivity between a country pair in time t, dins is a source-destination-
sector fixed effect, dist is a source-sector-time fixed effect, and dnst is a destination-sector-time
fixed effect. As described in Section 3, my measure of cablesint will take two forms: 1) The
raw number of cables, i.e. the coefficient will be a semi-elasticity between cable number and
log point increase in exports; and 2) The logged capacity (GB/s) of all cables between two
countries, i.e. the coefficient is an elasticity between the log point addition in cable capacity
and the log point increase in exports.
Since I allow for a difference in the effect of cables on my two groups of services sectors,
my main estimation equation will take the form
ln(Xinst) =ln(β0) + γ1I{DIS sector} × cablesint
+ γ2I{non−DIS sector} × cablesint
+ γ3I{goods sector} × cablesint
+ θinsdins + θistdist + θnstdnst + ηinst,
(4.3)
where γ1 and γ2 are the parameters of interest.
Table E.9 presents the results for the full sample using all available data. All standard
errors are clustered at the source-destination level. Exports in services increase across the
board, but the coefficients for DIS are nearly double those of other services. The measure
using cable capacity delivers more precise estimates than that using only raw cable number.
As not all cables are created equal, this result supports the idea that growth in services
trade is correlated with growth in capacity. These results are robust to several additional
considerations. See Section 4.2 for full detail.
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I readily admit that, when considering the full sample, these results tell only a correl-
ative story. There is clear endogeneity in the regressors as infrastructure projects are not
exogenous. In the following section, I discuss an identification strategy that establishes two
possible cases where connections to cables could be exogenous.
4.1 Identification
I follow the “routing” identification strategy of Chandra & Thompson (2000), Michaels
(2008), and Fajgelbaum & Redding (2014). The obvious endogeneity is that cables will be
built where there is a desire for them. Then the construction of cables will be correlated with
higher services trade due to projected growth rather than admitting any sort of causal story;
providing reliable capacity to a country would not promote service trade, rather the desire for
a cable is only indicative of underlying services growth. The main idea behind “routing” is
that while the infrastructure assignment is non-random, locations can be treated with cable
infrastructure for a reason aside from characteristics unobserved to the econometrician: these
places happen to lie along the route between two other important locations. In the case of the
fiber-optic cables between Western Europe and East Asia, the funding for the construction
came mostly from the telecom companies at either end rather than countries in between. I
consider two possible stories: 1) All countries not in Western Europe or East Asia6 received
cable connections due to routing; 2) Egypt – due to the presence of the Gulf of Suez, the
Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden – is routed through only because it provides the shortest
possible land route between the two bodies of water abutting Europe and East Asia. In
particular, there exist four such cables (Figures E.4, E.5, E.6, E.7) that have landing points
in between the Europe-East Asia route. In this empirical exercise, I consider the effect that
connectivity with these cables increases services trade between the connected countries, but
not other nearby countries.
Tables E.10 and E.11 present the results for regression equation 4.3.7 In this case, only
6A list of these countries is presented in Table E.7.
7For the exercise with Egypt as the only source country, the destination-sector-time and source-sector-time
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the coefficient on exports for data-intensive services is positive. Other services remain flat or
even decline. The magnitudes are much larger than those of the previous exercise, suggesting
that these individual countries tend to expand their DIS exports faster than the countries
who are responsible for routing the cables. As it remains unclear why other services would
decline with the expansion of Internet connectivity, these results push me again to favor my
measurement using cable capacities.
4.2 Robustness
I provide robustness checks to three anticipated concerns: 1) Only the first cable connection
matters; 2) The importance of cable connectivity is nonlinear; and 3) The dropped zeros in
the gravity equation are driving the results.
4.2.1 Single Cable
Consideration of my results and identification strategy might lead one to suspect that only
the first connection to a fiber-optic cable is important. Table E.12 presents my estimates
for coding a cable variable with a maximum value of 1: any additional cable connections
are seen as redundant. The weak precision in these estimates suggests that a single cable’s
connection does not do a very good job at capturing the full effect. As previous results
suggested that the capacity measurements do a relatively better job, it is not surprising that
the single-cable results do not tell the full story.
4.2.2 Quadratic Term
It may be the case that the relationship between connectivity and service trade is nonlinear.
To test this hypothesis, I rerun all of the capacity regressions with a quadratic term included.
Table E.13 presents the results. Here, the coefficients are consistent with a story of only
higher connections mattering: the quadratic is positive while the linear coefficient is negative.
fixed effects are replaced with year dummies to identify the effects.
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This result pairs nicely with my findings on single cable connections, as the first cable is likely
to have the least capacity.
4.2.3 Zeros
Research into the zeros in trade data neccessitates the consideration of other estimation
procedures that can account for them. In particular, Santos Silva & Tenreyro address the
bias in estimates of the gravity model under heteroskedasticity. They advise use of a Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimatation (PML) that performs significantly better in the
presence of heteroskedasticity. However, due to the high dimensionality in the fixed effects I
use for estimation, I can only present results here for a smaller sample. Table E.14 presents
the results for the case of Egypt. The results for DIS remain consistently positive, but the
PML procedure yields strongly negative coefficients for other services. As this latter result
is a bit puzzling, I leave it as an area for future research.
5 Extensions
The use of this new source of data, the undersea fiber-optic cable network, raises many
questions that I am not able to answer in my current analysis. I address a few of them here
as avenues for further research.
My analysis has mainly focused on bilateral connections as measured by landing sites for
the various cables. This measure precludes landlocked countries in the data from receiving
any effect from cable connectivity. In practice, this is not quite right. While Switzerland’s
access to the United States will be gated by any existing underground cables connecting
it to a coastal country, it may certainly make use of a France-to-U.S. undersea fiber-optic
cable once data make it to the Atlantic. With more data on land routes for communications
infrastructure, one would be able to estimate the effect of coastal cables on inland countries
who will have less control over cable placement, giving a sound identification structure.
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If cable connectivity is as good an indicator of service sector export growth as I have
measured (for specific service sectors), one could use the cables as an IV for the effect of
service growth on total country growth. The World Bank’s position is that the service sector
is vital to overall domestic welfare, so any expansion thereof should have substantial welfare
implications.
Lastly, this research question could also speak to the idea of “blueprint” transfer in FDI
as in Keller (2001). A branch of future research could use the Internet connectivity measure
as a clearer mechanism for the transfer of ideas via FDI; transfer of inventions is likely higher
through the Internet than embodied in goods trade.
6 Conclusion
By creating a dataset of the undersea fiber-optic cable network, I find that improving bilateral
Internet connections promotes bilateral service trade in data-intensive sectors. I argue that
this effect is true both in the aggregate world economy and in particular for a smaller subset
of countries for whom I argue the cable connections to be exogenous. Service sectors in
finance, computers and information, and other business services tend to have the greatest
effects.
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Appendix A: Data Summary and
Simulation Procedure
In this section, I detail the creation of the main variables I use in my estimation procedure
for κ, and provide more information on my simulation procedure.
Trade Data
My trade data come from two different sources as each has different advantages. I use COM-
TRADE data for the creation of my instrument detailed in Section 5.1. The United Nations
Commodity Trade Statistics Database contains detailed imports and exports statistics re-
ported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or areas. It concerns annual trade
data from 1962 to the most recent year. I use a subsample of two decades beginning in 1992
(for robustness, I also consider 1993 as a base year).
I translate the SITC Rev. 3 product codes from COMTRADE to ISIC Rev. 3 to NACE
Rev. 1 at the two-digit level via the correspondence tables provided by the UNSD and
Eurostat RAMON. I do so in order to match the categorization of the trade data and
German employment data. I translate first to the ISIC Rev. 3 nomenclature as it matches
fairly easily to NACE Rev. 1. The SITC Rev. 3 to ISIC Rev 3. match is less straightforward.
For all cases where (e.g.) a SITC industry maps to two or more ISIC industries, I evenly
divide the flow value into each ISIC bin. As an example, SITC 5226 is the code for Inorganic
Bases and Metallic Oxies, Hydroxides, and Peroxides, N.E.S., which maps to both Chemicals
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Figure A.1: German and IV Group Manufacturing Imports from China
Notes: Data on trade flows come from COMTRADE.
and Chemical Products (ISIC 24) and Other Non-Metallic Minerals (ISIC 26). Therefore, I
divide the value for SITC 5226 in half and assign it to each of the two ISIC categories.
I apply this method to all annual manufacturing imports from China reported by Ger-
many and the IV Group countries. Figure A.1 displays an index for manufacturing imports
from China for both Germany and the IV Group. As expected, imports from China grow
steadily during the entire sample period, and the IV Group does a good job imitating German
import movements.
I use the WIOD for my simulation exercise.8 This database has the added benefit of
non-manufacturing sectoral output and imports, but it lacks the full range of years of the
COMTRADE database. The industry specificity is also less granular, but much easier to
match as can be seen in Table A.1. I use data between 2005-2011 to perform simulations
and welfare calculations for the individual κ values.
8Specifically, I use the 2013 Release tables. While this set of tables lacks data for 2012, the matches
between ISIC Rev. 3 and the German NACE categories are clearer.
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Table A.1: Sector Definitions and Elasticities
Industry Manufacturing WIOD NACE Caliendo & Parro θs
Food, Beverages and Tobacco Y 15-16 15-16 2.55
Textiles and Textile Products Y 17-18 17 5.56
Leather, Leather and Footwear Y 19 18-19 5.56
Wood and Products of Wood and Cork Y 20 20 10.83
Pulp, Paper, Paper , Printing and Publishing Y 21-22 21-22 9.07
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel Y 23 23 51.08
Chemicals and Chemical Products Y 24 24 4.75
Rubber and Plastics Y 25 25 1.66
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Y 26 26 2.76
Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Y 27-28 27-28 7.99
Machinery, Nec Y 29 29 1.52
Electrical and Optical Equipment Y 30-33 30-33 10.60
Transport Equipment Y 34-35 34-35 0.69α
Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling Y 36-37 36 5.00
Aggregated Non-manufacturing Sector N All else All else 4.55β
Notes: Closest sector-to-sector matches between the WIOD and NACE Rev. 1. αAs I combine autos and other transport in
my estimation procedure, I take the average of [21]’s findings in these two sectors. β4.55 is the aggregate elasticity value found
by same.
Group-level variables
In order to solve for the proportional change in sector-specific wages, I need: 1) Data on
group-level income levels (Yig), trade imbalances (Di), trade shares (λijs), expenditure shares
(βis), labor allocation shares (piigs), and labor endowments (Lig).
The German labor market data (Yig, Lig, piigs) at the local sector level come from the
IAB Establishment History Panel (BHP; see Spengler (2008) for more information) which
includes the universe of all German establishments with at least one employee subject to
social security. This data set consists of an annual panel with approximately 2.7 million
yearly observations on establishments aggregated from mandatory notifications to social
security starting in 1975 (1992 for East Germany). Due to the administrative origin, the
data are restricted to information relevant for social security (structure of workforce with
regard to age, sex, nationality, qualification, occupation, wage) but at the same time are
highly reliable and available on a highly disaggregated level. Detailed data for regional
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sectoral employment is available from 1978 onwards. I define groups by skill level and local
labor market. My skill groups are given by “share of unskilled full-time employment” and the
remaining full-time employed. Labor allocation shares piigs are computed as the employment
share piigs = LigsLig and earnings share piigs =
Yigs
Yig
.
The trade data (Di, λijs, βis) at the country-sector level come from the World Input-
Output Database (see Timmer et al. (2015)). In order to ensure that the sum of the Yig
add up to the Yi from the WIOD, data from the BHP are rescaled according to the formula,
Y WIODig ≡
Y BHPig
Y BHPi
Y WIODi , where BHP and WIOD give the source of each variable.
Simulation Steps
In this section, I provide detail to the simulation procedure performed in Section 6. To
solve for the proportional change in sector-specific wages, wˆis, I use the system of equations
given by 3.7. To that end, I first collect : 1) Data on group-level income levels (Yig), trade
imbalances (Dj), trade shares (λijs), expenditure shares (βis), labor allocation shares (piigs),
and labor endowments (Lig) as detailed above; 2) Parameter values for the shape parameters
on sectoral technologies (θs) and group efficiencies/flexibilities (κig), given by Table A.1 and
κig = κˆ as presented in Table 1.5; and 3) A measure of the shocks to trade costs (τˆijs) from
the gravity model as described in Section 6. Using Equations 3.9 and 3.10, I can then use
the wˆis to solve for the proportional changes in trade shares and sector employment shares.
The algorithm works as follows:
1. Choose a value for κ.
2. Formulate guess for the NxS (number of countries by number of sectors, 41x15) matrix
of wˆis.
3. Given wˆis, compute Yˆig, λˆigs, and pˆiigs for all country-group-sector triads as given in
Equations 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, respectively.
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4. Plug in values for the NxS equations for excess labor demand given by
∑
j
λˆijsλijsβjs
∑
g∈Gj
YˆjgYjg +Dj
 = ∑
g∈Gi
pˆiigsYˆigpiigsYig.
5. Update guess for wˆis to minimize excess labor demand.
6. Go back to Step 3 and repeat until converged.
With the solution for the counterfactual change in country-sector wages, I can calculate the
change in welfare according to Equations 3.12 and 3.13. I repeat this process for each value
of κˆ given in Table 1.7.
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Appendix B: Robustness Exercises
Alternate Base Years
Eastern European Trade Shock
In this exercise, I follow DFS in their focus on the effects of trade with China (the “far” east)
and Eastern Europe9 (the “near” east) in manufacturing. The fall in the Iron Curtain led
to increased demand for German manufacturing goods (e.g. autos), while the rise of China
led to strong foreign competition in some sectors (e.g. clothing). To define how groups of
9In line with DFS, I consider Eastern Europe to comprise the countries Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former USSR or its succession states Russian Federa-
tion, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Table B.1: Estimates for κ, Before and After Hartz I-IV
1993-2003 2002-2012 2003-2013
IV uses: Emp. Share Earn. Share Emp. Share Earn. Share Emp. Share Earn. Share
κˆ 2.235*** 2.023*** 4.739*** 4.844*** 4.718*** 4.873***
(0.212) (0.233) (0.170) (0.187) (0.162) (0.171)
First Stage F-Stat 51.04 33.31 100.27 96.82 115.15 107.16
N 210 210 210 210 210 210
R2 0.2088 0.1814 0.3423 0.3412 0.2594 0.2627
Notes: The independent variable for this regression is the instrument described in Equation 5.3. The dependent variable is is
given by pˆiigs =
Lˆigs
Lig
and pˆiigs =
Yˆigs
Yˆig
, respectively. A group is the set of full-time employees for a particular local-labor-market-
skill pair. The dichotomous skill variable measures “unskilled” full-time employees vs. all others. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level.
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Table B.2: Estimates for κ, Before and After Hartz I-IV
1992-2002 2005-2012
Measurement of IV uses: Emp. Share Earn. Share Emp. Share Earn. Share
κˆ 1.227*** 1.131*** 4.563*** 4.708***
(0.149) (0.148) (0.168) (0.176)
First Stage F-Statistic 49.94 37.02 61.95 58.69
N 210 210 210 210
R2 0.1124 0.0064 0.2688 0.2703
Notes: The independent variable for this regression is the instrument described in Equation 5.3. The dependent variable is is
given by pˆiigs =
Lˆigs
Lig
and pˆiigs =
Yˆigs
Yˆig
, respectively. A group is the set of full-time employees for a particular local-labor-market-
skill pair. The dichotomous skill variable measures “unskilled” full-time employees vs. all others. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level.
individuals are potentially affected by the rise of the East during the time periods of interest,
I construct an analogous measure of trade export exposure at the sector level, given by
∆ [export exposure]EEst ≡
∆EXDEU→EEst
Lst
, (.1)
where ‘EE’ represents Eastern Europe.
As in Section 5.1, denote the IV Group countries by ‘OTHER ’ with ∆EXOTHER→EEst
defined as above, with the exception that the trade flows are out of these ‘OTHER’ countries
rather than Germany. I use these trade flows to construct the instrument as
∆ [IV export exposure]EEst ≡
∆EXOTHER→EEst
Lst
. (.2)
Table B.2 presents the results for estimating κ using Equation 5.5 for the periods 1992-2002
and 2005-2012. While the coefficients are in the same range as those in Table 1.5, the weaker
F-statistics and R2 cause me to favor the results without Eastern Europe.
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Appendix C: Full Derivation of
Model
Here I present a full derivation of the model.
Demand side
Technology. Suppose there are N countries indexed by i, j and S sectors indexed by s.
Labor is the only factor of production. There are constant returns to scale in the production
of each sector. Labor is mobile across sectors and immobile across countries.10 Denote the
number of workers in country i by Li and the country-sector-specific efficiency wage as wis.
Goods in each sector s may come in an infinite number of varieties indexed by ω ∈ Ω, where
Ω ≡ [1, 2, ...,∞]. Denote by zis(ω) the number of units of a variety ω in sector s that can
be produced by one unit of labor in country i. Assume, for all countries, sectors, and their
varieties, that zis(ω) is independently drawn from an {i, s}-specific Fréchet distribution such
that
Fis(z) = exp[−Tisz−θs ], ∀z ≥ 0,
where zis > 0 and θs > 1.
10Labor is also immobile across “groups” as defined above, but the derivation is the same regardless of
modeling groups in each country.
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Each sector s aggregates varieties ω unique to sector s using a CES production function
Yis =
[∫
Ω
Qis(ω)(ν−1)/νdω
]ν/(ν−1)
,
where ν denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties, Qis(ω) gives the amount of
variety ω that is produced, and Yis is the total output of country i in sector s.
Trade costs. I make the “iceberg” trade cost assumption. For each unit of a good in
sector s shipped from country i to country j, only 1/τijs units arrive. I normalize τiis =
1 ∀i, s,11 and assume the trade cost of traveling through any additional country between i
and j is greater than or equal to the cost of traveling between i and j.
Market structure. Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Since production
has constant returns to scale in each sector, and goods and factor markets are perfectly
competitive, the price at which country i supplies a good in sector s to j is
Pijs(ω) =
τijswis
zis(ω)
.
Buyers of each good in sector s in country j will pay the minimum possible cost amongst
countries. Thus, the actual price they pay is
Pjs(ω) = min1≤i≤N
{
τijswis
zis(ω)
}
.
Preferences. In each country, there exists a representative consumer with a two-level
utility function. The “upper” tier utility function is Cobb-Douglas with shares ∑ βjs = 1,
while the “lower” tier utility function is one with constant elasticity of substitution:
Uj =
∏
s
X
βjs
js ,
with budget constraint Xj = Yj+Dj. Then total expenditure of variety ω of a good in sector
11I do not have data on trade between groups in Germany.
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s is given by
Xjs(ω) = [Pjs(ω)/Pjs]1−σs · βjsXj,
where 0 ≤ βjs ≤ 1 and Pjs ≡ [∑ω pjs(ω)1−σs ]1/1−σs . Denote the total value of exports from
country i to country j in sector s by
Xjs ≡
Ωijs∑
ω
Xjs(ω),
where Ωijs ≡ {ω ∈ Ω|cijs(ω) = min1≤i≤N cijs(ω)} is the set of varieties in sector s that
country i exports to country j. Denote the share of exports from country i to country j in
sector s by
λijs ≡ Xijs∑
iXijs
.
I do not make the balanced trade assumption in Costinot et al. (2012). I do require, however,
that world trade is balanced, namely ∑iDi = 0.
Equilibrium. The competitive equilibrium of this model world economy consists of a
set of prices, allocation rules, and trade shares such that: (i) Given the prices, all firms’
labor inputs satisfy the first-order conditions, and their output is given by the production
function; (ii) Given the prices, the consumers’ demand satisfies the first-order conditions;
(iii) The prices ensure the market clearing conditions for labor and goods; (iv) Trade shares
ensure trade is balanced globally. The prices are the wage rate, sectoral prices, and aggregate
price levels. The allocation rules include the allocation labor across sectors and consumption
demand for each sector.
Following EK, define
Φjs =
N∑
i=1
Tis(τijswis)−θs .
Substituting the expression for sectoral-level prices into the productivity CDF above, the
Fréchet distribution gives a convenient form for the distribution of prices: the price of a
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good in sector s in country j is simply
Pjs = Γ
[
1 + 1− σs
θs
]1/(1−σs)
· (Φjs)−1/θs ,
where Γ is the gamma function. This is the result given by Equation 3.3. This EK structure
in each sector s also delivers the result that the probability of importing good ω from country
i is equal to the share of total spending on goods coming from country i. Namely,
λijs ≡ Xijs∑
iXijs
= Tis(τijswis)
−θs∑
i Tis(τijswis)−θs
,
as in Equation 3.2. Using this notation, it follows that the demand for efficiency units in
{i, s} is given by
1
wis
∑
j
λijsβjsXj,
mirroring the result in Equation 3.1.
Supply side
Technology. Suppose there are Gi groups in country i who provide labor in sectors s as
characterized above. Denote by igs the number of units in sector s that can be produced by
one unit of labor in country-group ig.12 Assume, for all countries, groups, and sectors, that
igs is independently drawn from an {i, g, s}-specific Fréchet distribution such that
Figs() = exp[−Aigs−κig ], ∀ ≥ 0,
where igs > 0 and κig > 1.
Occupational choice. Workers choose the sector in which they earn their highest in-
12There is a slight abuse in notation here. In the main text (as in Equation 3.4), I use z rather than . So
as not to confuse the reader by using z for both the demand and supply side distributions, I use  in this
appendix.
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come, and their choice of sector determines labor supply. More formally, define a set of
productivities  = (ig,1, ig,2, ..., ig,S) and let Ωig ≡ { s.t. igswis ≥ igrwir ∀r ∈ S}. Any
worker with productivity vector  will choose to work in sector s if and only if  ∈ Ωig. Said
differently, the probability that the worker in ig chooses to work in sector s is the proba-
bility that igswis yields the greatest income. As in Section 6, given that the productivity
draws are iid Fréchet, the greatest income (highest utility) can also be characterized by a
Fréchet distribution. Accordingly, the probability that a given worker in {i, g} (and therefore
proportion of the workers in Lig) to select into sector s can be given by
piigs ≡
∫
Ωig
dFigs() =
Aigsw
κig
is∑
sAigsw
κig
is
,
which is the result in Equation 3.4. For a given group, the average productivity in each
sector is
E[igs] = ηig
(
Aigs
piigs
)1/κig
,
where ηig ≡ Γ
[
1− 1
κig
]
. Then the supply of efficiency units in {i, g, s}can be given by
Eigs ≡ Lig
∫
Ωis
sdFig()
Lig
∫
Ωis
sdFig() = E[igs]piigsLig
= ηig
 AigsAigswκigis∑
s
Aigsw
κig
is

1/κig
piigsLig
= ηig
1
wis
(∑
s
Aigsw
κig
is
)1/κig
piigsLig
= ηig
Φig
wis
piigsLig
where Φκigig =
∑
sAigsw
κig
is , providing the result in Equation 3.5.
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Appendix D: Cable Network Data
When constructing the cable network dataset, I am forced to make a decision on how to
quantify a bilateral pair’s connectivity. One approach would be to create a dichotomous
variable that takes a value of one whenever at lease one cable links two countries (as is the
case in Table E.12). In this interpretation, the relevant factor is whether two countries are
connected through a submarine cable at all. To better replicate the nature of data transfer,
however, I would like to use a more nuanced measure of the capacity of connectivity between
two points.
With the data available to me, I can make two possible refinements. I can include a
cummulative total of the connecting cables between two countries, or I can measure the
available bandwidth between those two countries. As more cables increase the available
bandwidth between two endpoints, these two measures are highly correlated. They are not
identical, however, as each cable is not identical in the bandwidth it provides. The capacities
of cables have grown over time, and there is also significant variation within a given year.
This latter form of variation is often due to geographical anomalies requiring low-capacity
cables to service small islands. As an example, the 2011 Europe-India Gateway is a high-
capacity cable connecting two continents whereas the 2011 Energinet Laeso-Varberg cable
connects the Danish island of Laeso to Varberg, Sweden. Without taking capacity into
account, these connections would be face neutral.
From a technological perspective, using the capacity measurement would be a better
solution over the cable count. Unfortunately, some of the smaller cables do not publically
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list their capacities. As a result, I use both measures in my estimation and analysis. The
gravity regression results tell similar stories between the two measurements. I prefer the
capacity results over the raw cable count as the coefficient is more interpretable – log points
of capacity translate to log points of services exports rather than translating an integer of
cables to log points of services exports.
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Appendix E: Supplementary Tables
and Figures
Table E.1: ICP-ICIO Concordance
ICP ICIO ICIO Tradable
Health Health & Social Work 85 N
Transport Transport & Storage 60t63 N
Communication Post & Telecommunications 64 N
Recreation & Culture Other community, Social & Personal Services 90t93 N
Education Education 80 N
Restaurants & Hotels Hotels & Restaurants 55 N
Food & Non-Alcohol Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 15t16 Y
Alcohol, Tobacco, & Narcotics Food Products, Beverages & Tobacco 15t16 Y
Clothing & Footwear Textiles, Textile Products, Leather & Footwear 17t19 Y
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Table E.2: Value added share in gross output by sector
Country Trad. Non-trad. ωN Health Trans. Comm. Rec. Educ. Rest. Cons.
AUS 0.40 0.52 0.80 0.67 0.44 0.49 0.59 0.75 0.46 0.31
AUT 0.32 0.53 0.79 0.62 0.40 0.44 0.56 0.83 0.61 0.40
BEL 0.21 0.50 0.85 0.60 0.33 0.53 0.41 0.88 0.38 0.28
BGR 0.26 0.47 0.72 0.57 0.31 0.56 0.44 0.78 0.58 0.26
BRA 0.30 0.61 0.76 0.56 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.71 0.42 0.52
BRN 0.77 0.59 0.30 0.66 0.72 0.80 0.52 0.86 0.43 0.21
CAN 0.40 0.60 0.78 0.82 0.56 0.63 0.58 0.78 0.50 0.43
CHE 0.36 0.57 0.79 0.68 0.35 0.52 0.45 0.73 0.51 0.47
CHL 0.42 0.55 0.69 0.61 0.34 0.48 0.69 0.81 0.45 0.53
CHN 0.24 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.47 0.60 0.45 0.58 0.40 0.25
COL 0.48 0.60 0.67 0.40 0.44 0.55 0.57 0.79 0.46 0.50
CRI 0.33 0.60 0.77 0.69 0.48 0.51 0.65 0.85 0.47 0.42
CYP 0.33 0.61 0.91 0.65 0.54 0.63 0.58 0.87 0.49 0.37
CZE 0.23 0.43 0.72 0.59 0.37 0.54 0.40 0.75 0.41 0.29
DEU 0.31 0.57 0.75 0.70 0.36 0.42 0.60 0.77 0.50 0.43
DNK 0.34 0.52 0.83 0.70 0.26 0.43 0.52 0.73 0.38 0.37
ESP 0.30 0.60 0.83 0.64 0.42 0.48 0.55 0.85 0.63 0.50
EST 0.27 0.46 0.77 0.61 0.28 0.42 0.43 0.70 0.34 0.32
FIN 0.26 0.53 0.79 0.65 0.39 0.47 0.53 0.70 0.41 0.35
FRA 0.25 0.58 0.87 0.75 0.46 0.44 0.53 0.82 0.47 0.45
GBR 0.35 0.53 0.85 0.51 0.42 0.52 0.54 0.70 0.47 0.41
GRC 0.33 0.65 0.86 0.70 0.44 0.79 0.57 0.91 0.73 0.29
HKG 0.16 0.56 0.98 0.71 0.40 0.28 0.51 0.74 0.53 0.51
HRV 0.35 0.53 0.76 0.67 0.47 0.55 0.47 0.79 0.57 0.33
HUN 0.23 0.53 0.73 0.58 0.41 0.60 0.51 0.76 0.36 0.41
IDN 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.40 0.78 0.50 0.60 0.45 0.35
IND 0.35 0.63 0.66 0.60 0.44 0.58 0.74 0.90 0.27 0.35
IRL 0.31 0.46 0.71 0.56 0.31 0.42 0.41 0.76 0.46 0.26
ISL 0.33 0.48 0.78 0.54 0.25 0.35 0.48 0.56 0.38 0.34
ISR 0.34 0.59 0.83 0.49 0.43 0.62 0.48 0.75 0.44 0.46
ITA 0.28 0.54 0.81 0.63 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.85 0.47 0.43
JPN 0.31 0.63 0.80 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.67 0.80 0.45 0.49
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Table E.3: Value added share in gross output by sector
Country Trad. Non-trad. ωN Health Trans. Comm. Rec. Educ. Rest. Cons.
KHM 0.45 0.53 0.46 0.62 0.47 0.56 0.70 0.70 0.38 0.48
KOR 0.21 0.51 0.66 0.55 0.33 0.39 0.50 0.76 0.33 0.35
LTU 0.30 0.65 0.75 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.61 0.80 0.72 0.53
LUX 0.28 0.34 0.93 0.75 0.45 0.40 0.62 0.83 0.49 0.40
LVA 0.28 0.43 0.80 0.61 0.36 0.40 0.49 0.74 0.39 0.21
MEX 0.43 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.73 0.61 0.64 0.90 0.74 0.50
MLT 0.34 0.41 0.84 0.68 0.30 0.48 0.26 0.83 0.37 0.35
MYS 0.26 0.46 0.53 0.34 0.27 0.49 0.33 0.64 0.38 0.25
NLD 0.28 0.53 0.81 0.73 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.78 0.51 0.36
NOR 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.78 0.28 0.39 0.52 0.78 0.49 0.38
NZL 0.31 0.51 0.79 0.63 0.42 0.50 0.51 0.71 0.46 0.30
PHL 0.36 0.60 0.66 0.52 0.44 0.61 0.49 0.68 0.37 0.55
POL 0.27 0.52 0.75 0.60 0.38 0.53 0.54 0.81 0.53 0.34
PRT 0.26 0.54 0.83 0.56 0.41 0.49 0.50 0.85 0.49 0.34
ROU 0.39 0.46 0.67 0.53 0.40 0.53 0.53 0.81 0.46 0.35
SAU 0.77 0.58 0.40 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.80 0.46 0.39
SGP 0.22 0.43 0.79 0.54 0.34 0.44 0.49 0.69 0.46 0.23
SVK 0.23 0.48 0.74 0.57 0.34 0.53 0.62 0.75 0.52 0.39
SVN 0.29 0.51 0.76 0.63 0.34 0.47 0.45 0.76 0.48 0.31
SWE 0.31 0.53 0.80 0.72 0.32 0.41 0.50 0.67 0.37 0.44
THA 0.29 0.52 0.56 0.46 0.33 0.59 0.29 0.78 0.34 0.22
TUN 0.37 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.77 0.86 0.90 0.58 0.30
TUR 0.26 0.58 0.71 0.51 0.49 0.55 0.53 0.78 0.44 0.43
TWN 0.20 0.60 0.72 0.61 0.35 0.56 0.52 0.80 0.51 0.29
USA 0.35 0.61 0.84 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.61 0.74 0.53 0.53
VNM 0.32 0.49 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.71 0.68 0.68 0.52 0.26
ZAF 0.32 0.54 0.75 0.46 0.53 0.41 0.70 0.51 0.45 0.30
Mean 0.33 0.54 0.73 0.61 0.42 0.53 0.53 0.76 0.47 0.37
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Table E.4: Share of tradable intermediate inputs by sector
Country Trad. Non-trad. Country Trad. Non-trad.
AUS 0.52 0.19 KHM 0.80 0.57
AUT 0.60 0.19 KOR 0.81 0.44
BEL 0.60 0.17 LTU 0.56 0.33
BGR 0.60 0.34 LUX 0.61 0.08
BRA 0.65 0.26 LVA 0.58 0.21
BRN 0.86 0.32 MEX 0.71 0.35
CAN 0.63 0.25 MLT 0.68 0.19
CHE 0.52 0.22 MYS 0.79 0.41
CHL 0.63 0.27 NLD 0.63 0.19
CHN 0.80 0.54 NOR 0.60 0.24
COL 0.68 0.34 NZL 0.57 0.20
CRI 0.59 0.30 PHL 0.76 0.42
CYP 0.61 0.30 POL 0.63 0.31
CZE 0.71 0.22 PRT 0.62 0.23
DEU 0.62 0.21 ROU 0.60 0.33
DNK 0.48 0.26 SAU 0.68 0.22
ESP 0.60 0.26 SGP 0.62 0.18
EST 0.63 0.24 SVK 0.69 0.25
FIN 0.57 0.28 SVN 0.61 0.24
FRA 0.57 0.19 SWE 0.55 0.19
GBR 0.58 0.18 THA 0.75 0.45
GRC 0.60 0.24 TUN 0.75 0.53
HKG 0.43 0.13 TUR 0.73 0.34
HRV 0.57 0.35 TWN 0.75 0.41
HUN 0.67 0.27 USA 0.67 0.23
IDN 0.75 0.53 VNM 0.80 0.54
IND 0.69 0.46 ZAF 0.55 0.26
IRL 0.59 0.17 Mean 0.64 0.29
ISL 0.59 0.19
ISR 0.62 0.20
ITA 0.57 0.23
JPN 0.68 0.33
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Table E.5: Industry Tradability
Sector Code Feenstra AMECO
C01T05 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing T T
C10T14 Mining and quarrying T T
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco T T
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear T T
C20 Wood and products of wood and cork T T
C21T22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing T T
C23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel T T
C24 Chemicals and chemical products T T
C25 Rubber and plastics products T T
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products T T
C27 Basic metals T T
C28 Fabricated metal products T T
C29 Machinery and equipment, nec T T
C30T33X Computer, Electronic and optical equipment T T
C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec T T
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers T T
C35 Other transport equipment T T
C36T37 Manufacturing nec; recycling T T
C40T41 Electricity, gas and water supply N N
C45 Construction N N
C50T52 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs N T
C55 Hotels and restaurants N T
C60T63 Transport and storage N T
C64 Post and telecommunications N N
C65T67 Financial intermediation N N
C70 Real estate activities N N
C71 Renting of machinery and equipment N N
C72 Computer and related activities N N
C73T74 R&D and other business activities N N
C75 Public admin. and defense; compulsory social security N N
C80 Education N N
C85 Health and social work N N
C90T93 Other community, social and personal services N N
Notes: The Table reports the average and median sectoral labor shares for the countries in our sample Source: Authors
calculations based on ICIO Tables and the PWT.
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Figure E.1: Aggregate labor share and income per capita
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Figure E.2: Real exchange rates and sectoral differences in technologies
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’Residual’ corresponds to the relative prices implied by the term labeled ’Residual’ in equation (3.5).
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Table E.6: List of Countries
Afghanistan Costa Rica Haiti Moldova Singapore
Albania Cote d’Ivoire Honduras Mongolia Slovakia
Algeria Croatia Hong Kong Montenegro Slovenia
American Samoa Cuba Hungary Morocco Somalia
Andorra Cyprus Iceland Mozambique South Africa
Angola Czech Rep. India Myanmar Spain
Argentina Denmark Indonesia Namibia Sri Lanka
Armenia Djibouti Iran Nepal Sudan
Australia Dominican Republic Iraq Netherlands Suriname
Austria Ecuador Ireland New Zealand Sweden
Azerbaijan Egypt Israel Nicaragua Switzerland
Bahamas El Salvador Italy Niger Syria
Bahrain Equatorial Guinea Jamaica Nigeria Taiwan
Bangladesh Estonia Japan Norway Tajikistan
Belarus Ethiopia Jordan Oman Tanzania
Belgium Fiji Kazakhstan Pakistan Thailand
Belize Finland Kenya Palestine Togo
Benin France Korea Panama Tonga
Bermuda French Guiana Kuwait Papua New Guinea Tunisia
Bhutan French Polynesia Kyrgyzstan Paraguay Turkey
Bolivia Gabon Latvia Peru USA
Bosnia & Herzegovina Gambia Lebanon Philippines Uganda
Brazil Georgia Liberia Poland Ukraine
Brunei Germany Libya Portugal United Arab Emirates
Bulgaria Ghana Lithuania Puerto Rico Uruguay
Cambodia Gibraltar Luxembourg Qatar Uzbekistan
Cameroon Great Britain Madagascar Reunion Venezuela
Canada Greece Malaysia Romania Viet Nam
Cayman Islands Greenland Maldives Russia Virgin Islands (Brit.)
Central African Republic Grenada Mali Rwanda Yemen
Chad Guadeloupe Malta Samoa Zambia
Chile Guam Mauritania Saudi Arabia Zimbabwe
China Guatemala Mauritius Senegal
Colombia Guinea Mayotte Serbia
Congo (Dem. Rep. of) Guyana Mexico Seychelles
Table E.7: Routing Subsample
Bangladesh Jordan Pakistan Thailand
Djibouti Lebanon Philippines Tunisia
Egypt Malaysia Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates
India Morocco South Africa
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Table E.8: List of Service Sectors
200 Total EBOPS Services 249 4 Construction services
205 1 Transportation 250 4.1 Construction abroad
206 1.1 Sea transport 251 4.2 Construction in the compiling economy
207 1.1.1 Passenger 253 5 Insurance services
208 1.1.2 Freight 254 5.1 Life insurance and pension funding
209 1.1.3 Other 255 5.2 Freight insurance
210 1.2 Air transport 256 5.3 Other direct insurance
211 1.2.1 Passenger 257 5.4 Reinsurance
212 1.2.2 Freight 258 5.5 Auxiliary services
213 1.2.3 Other 260 6 Financial services
214 1.3 Other transport 262 7 Computer and information services
215 1.3.1 Passenger 263 7.1 Computer services
216 1.3.2 Freight 264 7.2 Information services
217 1.3.3 Other 266 8 Royalties and license fees
218 1.4 Space transport 268 9 Other business services
219 1.5 Rail transport 269 9.1 Merchanting and other trade-related services
220 1.5.1 Passenger 270 9.1.1 Merchanting
221 1.5.2 Freight 271 9.1.2 Other trade-related services
222 1.5.3 Other 272 9.2 Operational leasing services
223 1.6 Road transport 273 9.3 Misc. business, professional, and technical serv.
224 1.6.1 Passenger 274 9.3.1 Legal, accounting, consulting, public relations
225 1.6.2 Freight 275 9.3.1.1 Legal services
226 1.6.3 Other 276 9.3.1.2 Accounting, auditing, bookkeeping, tax serv.
227 1.7 Inland waterway transport 277 9.3.1.3 Business and management
228 1.7.1 Passenger 278 9.3.2 Advertising, market research
229 1.7.2 Freight 279 9.3.3 Research and development
230 1.7.3 Other 280 9.3.4 Architectural, engineering, other technical serv.
231 1.8 Pipeline trans./elec. transmission 281 9.3.5 Agricultural, mining, on-site processing serv.
232 1.9 Oth. supp./aux. trans. services 282 9.3.5.1 Waste treatment and depollution
236 2 Travel 283 9.3.5.2 Agric., mining, other on-site processing serv.
237 2.1 Business travel 284 9.3.6 Other business services
238 2.1.1 Exp. by seasonal/border workers 285 9.3.7 Services between related enterprises, n.i.e.
239 2.1.2 Other 287 10 Personal, cultural, and recreational services
240 2.2 Personal travel 288 10.1 Audiovisual and related services
241 2.2.1 Health-related expenditures 289 10.2 Other personal, cultural, and recreational serv.
242 2.2.2 Education-related expenditures 291 11 Government services, n.i.e.
243 2.2.3 Other 292 11.1 Embassies and consulate
245 3 Communications services 293 11.2 Military units and agencies
246 3.1 Postal and courier services 294 11.3 Other government services
247 3.2 Telecommunications services
Sectors in blue are considered data-intensive as measured by telecommunications input in WIOD.
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Figure E.3: Cable Map
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Figure E.4: FEA
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Figure E.5: SEA-ME-WE 3
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Figure E.6: SEA-ME-WE 4
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Figure E.7: IMEWE
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Table E.9: Full Sample
Cables (2-digit) Tb/s (2-digit) Cables (3-digit) Tb/s (3-digit)
Data-Intensive Services 0.066 0.258*** 0.127*** 0.338***
(0.044) (0.103) (0.048) (0.119)
Other Services 0.034 0.100** 0.146*** 0.377***
(0.025) (0.050) (0.055) (0.115)
Destination-Source-Sector FE Y Y Y Y
Source-Sector-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Destination-Sector-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 683,997 683,997 669,919 669,919
Groups 41,828 41,828 41,825 41,825
R2 0.880 0.880 0.878 0.878
Standard errors are clustered at the Destination-Source level. Asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Table E.10: Restricted Sample
Cables (2-digit) Tb/s (2-digit)
Data-Intensive Services 0.414** 1.822***
(0.208) (0.653)
Other Services -0.199 -0.289
(0.151) (0.708)
Destination-Source-Sector FE Y Y
Source-Sector-Year FE Y Y
Destination-Sector-Year FE Y Y
Observations 78,658 78,658
Groups 3,896 3,896
R2 0.890 0.890
Standard errors are clustered at the Destination-Source level. Asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Table E.11: Egypt Sample
Cables (2-digit) Tb/s (2-digit)
Data-Intensive Services 0.919*** 2.249**
(0.304) (1.110)
Other Services -0.370*** -1.288
(0.095) (0.791)
Destination-Source-Sector FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Observations 4,633 4,633
Groups 214 214
R2 0.842 0.842
Standard errors are clustered at the Destination-Source level. Asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Table E.12: Single Cable Connectivity
Full Sample (2-digit) Exo Sample (2-digit) Egypt (2-digit)
Data-Intensive Services 0.174* -0.076 0.628***
(0.094) (0.247) (0.105)
Other Services -0.053 0.136 -0.482**
(0.053) (0.284) (0.195)
Destination-Source-Sector FE Y Y Y
Source-Sector-Year FE Y Y N
Destination-Sector-Year FE Y Y N
Year FE N N Y
Observations 683,997 78,658 4,633
Groups 41,828 3,896 214
R2 0.880 0.890 0.842
Standard errors are clustered at the Destination-Source level. Asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
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Table E.13: Inclusion of Quadratic Term
Full Sample (2-digit) Exo Group (2-digit) Egypt (2-digit)
Gb/s, Data-Intensive Services 0.232 -18.940** -87.251**
(0.932) (9.140) (39.676)
Gb/s2, Data-Intensive Services -0.088 9.589** 43.796**
(0.464) (4.601) (19.874)
Gb/s, Other Services -0.034 14.800** 2.181
(0.053) (7.262) (7.279)
Gb/s2, Other Services 0.022 -7.445** -1.158
(0.266) (3.671) (3.650)
Destination-Source-Sector FE Y Y Y
Source-Sector-Year FE Y Y N
Destination-Sector-Year FE Y Y N
Year FE N N Y
Observations 683,997 78,658 4,633
Groups 41,828 3,896 214
R2 0.880 0.890 0.843
Standard errors are clustered at the Destination-Source level. Asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
Table E.14: Poisson PML (Egypt)
Cables (2-digit) Tb/s (2-digit)
Data-Intensive Services 0.533*** 1.157*
(0.190) (0.665)
Other Services -0.271** -0.834***
(0.119) (0.302)
Destination-Source-Sector FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Observationsa 4,644 4,644
Groupsa 217 217
Standard errors are clustered at the Destination-Source level. Asterisks represent statistical significance at
the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).
aThe glm command in Stata does not drop singleton observations. As such, there are 11 more observations
and three more groups than in previous regressions with this sample.
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